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ABSTRACT 
The central argument of this Article is that conflict over the 
judicial practice to use foreign authority leads to the manufacture 
of foreign law into a dangerous stranger.  Drawing on philosopher 
and sociologist Georg Simmel’s conceptualization of the stranger 
as a cultural object that sits on the border of the insider and 
outsider, I argue that there is a resistance to the use of foreign law 
in the United States.  Foreign laws, like immigrants in the United 
States, are being constructed as tolerable illegals or threatening 
legals. 
I perform an empirical qualitative content analysis of the senate 
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees and their 
discussions of the practice of judicial citation of foreign law.  The 
hearings of nominees Alito, Kagan, O’Connor, Roberts, and 
Sotomayor are studied.  During these hearings, conservatives label 
foreign law as biased and dangerous.  Most interestingly, however, 
are the ways in which foreign law emerges from these debates 
linked to otherness—particularly the otherness of disadvantaged 
gender and racial minorities.  The Article connects the 
transformation of foreign law into a stranger to other conservative 
movements that have constructed foreign national immigrants as 
illegal strangers who should be feared.  This work argues that 
foreign laws and decisions constitute a new American stranger. 
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Resistance is futile. 
—The Borg1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
US courts have long relied on authorities from outside the US 
when rendering opinions.  At the very beginning of the 19th 
century, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote several well-known 
opinions—including The Antelope2—that cited to foreign 
precedent.3  Concurring and dissenting opinions in the famous 
1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sandford4 made significant reference to 
foreign law.  Legal scholars have provided detailed evidence that 
the judiciary’s practice of citing foreign and international legal 
precedents has been taking place since the founding of the United 
States and has continued into the 21st century.5  In addition, there 
                                                     
1 The Borg are a fictional alien race from the popular television science fiction 
universe of Star Trek.  They are a collective of cybernetic organisms, which when 
they come into contact with other species, forcefully assimilate them and thereby 
add the “biological and technological distinctiveness” of the other species to their 
own.  The quote “Resistance is futile,” is sent as an audio message when the Borg 
targets a species and announces its plan for assimilation.  The Borg’s continued 
attempts to assimilate Earth and the humanoids that comprise the Federation are 
unsuccessful.  The story illustrates that when faced with conflict, and odds in 
favor of failure, human resistance need not be futile.  In fact, it can be productive.  
This Article attempts to illustrate that conflict and resistance—by both 
conservatives and progressive politicians—has productive and transformative 
effects with respect to how society understands the judicial citation to foreign and 
international laws. 
2 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).  The Antelope was a ship seized off the coast of 
Florida illegally importing slaves to the United States.  The Court ruled that 
federal slavery laws did require forfeiture of the foreign-owned slaves and that 
the slaves should be returned to their owners. 
3 Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
Decision, 47 WM. &  MARY  L. REV. 743, 763–80  (2005).  John Marshall was the 
fourth and longest serving chief justice in the history of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, from the years 1801–1835. 
4 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).  The Dred Scott decision ruled that Dred Scott, 
a person of African descent, was not a citizen, and neither were any individuals of 
African descent intended to be citizens under the U.S. Constitution.  As a result, 
Dred Scott did not have standing to sue in court. 
5 Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3.  See also David Zaring, The Use of Foreign 
Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297 
(2006) (examining how federal courts have used foreign legal authorities between 
1945 and 2005). 
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isn’t a significant record of resistance to courts using foreign law 
prior to the 21st century.6 
Yet despite two centuries of undisturbed practice, citing foreign 
authority became a controversial activity—practically overnight—
when the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.7  
The decision overturned state anti-sodomy statutes, and in its 
reasoning, cited decisions from the European Court of Human 
Rights.8  The debate over the use of foreign law began in the Court 
largely in the form of critiques lodged by Justice Scalia in dissent to 
the Lawrence majority.9  The press characterized the foreign citation 
in Lawrence as new, with one particular journalist mistakenly 
writing, “Never before had the Supreme Court’s majority cited a 
foreign legal precedent in such a big case.”10  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist actually cited foreign judicial opinions in two important 
civil rights due process cases.  These citations appear in the Court’s 
majority opinion in the assisted suicide case of Washington v. 
Glucksberg,11 and in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey12 decision on the 
                                                     
6 But see Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3, at 781–85 (highlighting a debate 
between the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 153 (1820), where Justice Livingston took issue with the majority’s use of 
foreign law and its references to foreign authors). 
7 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
8 Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). 
9 Id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  One might argue that Lawrence is not 
the beginning of the resistance to the citation of foreign law and point to Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 (2002), where 
in footnote 21, he referenced the world community’s disapproval of the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded 
offenders.  Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked the majority decision in dissent, 
writing that foreign law was irrelevant.  Id. at 322.  At the time, however, this 
issue did not draw much public attention.  Therefore, I agree with Calabresi & 
Zimdahl that the normative contestation over judicial foreign law citation began 
with Lawrence, supra note 3, at 748. 
10 Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases, USA TODAY (July 7, 
2003, 9:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-07-07-
foreign-usat_x.htm. 
11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  In Glucksberg, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist highlighted that there were other countries “embroiled” in a similar 
debate on euthanasia and relied on two foreign opinions.  Id. at 718 n.16.  The first 
case he cited was Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).  
Rehnquist noted that in Rodriguez, the Canadian court refused to state that the 
Charter of Freedom established a right to assisted suicide.  The second case that 
Rehnquist cited was Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 20, 
1997, M.P: Carlos Gaviria Diaz, Sentencia C-239/97 (Colom.), where the Corte 
Constitucional Colombia (Colombian Constitutional Court) decided to accept 
euthanasia. 
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right to reproductive choice.  Even after Lawrence, the press 
documented the contentious nature of federal court citation to 
foreign law.13 
The contestation over the use of foreign law took on a number 
of forms.  For example, the justices aired their views concerning 
foreign law in public debates between the justices,14 and public 
speeches given by the justices.15  A vigorous debate over the proper 
role of foreign law began in the legal academy.16  Some federal 
legislators have attempted (and continue to attempt) to regulate 
foreign citations by questioning Supreme Court nominees during 
the confirmation hearings on the propriety of using foreign law.  
Resistance to the judiciary’s use of foreign law has taken the form 
of states banning (or considering banning) the use of foreign, 
                                                     
12 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for 
Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER (Sep. 12, 2005), 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/09/12/050912fa_fact; Tim Wu, 
Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?, SLATE 
(Apr. 9, 2004, 5:03 PM),  http://www.slate.com/id/2098559/. 
14 Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Discussion of the 
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions at American University 
Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), available at 
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BD 
C2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocume
nt. 
15 See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the International 
Academy of Comparative Law at American University: A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication (July 30, 2010), in 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 927 (2011) 
(expressing her view as to how foreign legal materials contribute to American 
constitutional development); Justice Stephen Breyer, Address at the American 
Society of International Law: The Supreme Court and the New International Law 
(Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/ 
viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-04-03.html) (quoting Justice Ginsburg in 
expressing a firm opinion that “’[w]e are the losers if we neglect what others can 
tell us about endeavors . . . in our world’”). 
16 See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, Aristotle, Cicero and Cardozo: A 
Perspective on External Law, Address at the Albany Law Review Symposium: 
“Outsourcing Authority?” Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic 
Jurisprudence (Feb. 10, 2006), in 69 ALB. L. REV. 645 (2006) (discussing the recent 
revival of the historical debate over the role of foreign law in domestic judicial 
decisions); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (outlining the benefits and risks of 
American courts considering foreign and international law when ruling on 
domestic issues). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
02_LYKE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  
680 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:3 
international, and/or Sharia law in state courts.17  Similar 
contemplative banning measures have taken place at the federal 
level.18 
Representative Sandy Adams, a Republican member of the 
House representing the state of Florida, introduced a bill “to 
prevent the misuse of foreign law in Federal courts,” which, if 
enacted, would place limitations on the use of foreign law in 
federal courts.19  The bill states:  
In any court created by or under article III of the 
Constitution of the United States, no justice, judge, or other 
judicial official shall decide any issue in a case before that 
court in whole or in part on the authority of foreign law, 
except to the extent the Constitution or an Act of Congress 
requires the consideration of that foreign law.20   
Shortly after introducing the bill, Adams wrote in an op-ed that  
[t]he imposition of foreign precedent into our federal court 
system is a real threat to our Constitution and could 
fundamentally break down the very system put in place by 
our forefathers more than 200 years ago.  Each case that 
                                                     
17 On Nov. 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved State Question 755, amending 
the Oklahoma state constitution and forbidding the state courts from considering 
or using international law or Sharia Law.  See MARTHA F. DAVIS & JOHANNA KALB, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, ISSUE BRIEF: OKLAHOMA STATE QUESTION 755 AND 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-INTERNATIONAL LAW INITIATIVES (2011) (analyzing anti-
international law initiatives); Donna Leinwand, More States Enter Debate on Sharia 
Law, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2010, 10:29 AM), http:// 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-12-09-shariaban09_ST_ 
N.htm (highlighting the debate on the application of sharia law in different 
states).  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010) (banning the use of foreign 
law when “[its] application . . . will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by 
the constitution of [Louisiana] or of the United States”). 
18 See, e.g., John Cornyn, Domestic, Not Foreign: Our Laws Should be Judged by 
our Laws, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 28, 2005, 7:34 AM), http://www. 
nationalreview.com/articles/214011/domestic-not-foreign/john-cornyn.  Both 
legislative houses have introduced legislation in order to prevent the judiciary 
from using foreign law.  On March 20, 2005, Senator John Cornyn introduced 
Senate Resolution 92 stating that American courts should not be influenced by 
decisions in foreign courts.  S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).  See also Appropriate Role 
of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (discussing the appropriateness of citing foreign authorities in American 
case law). 
19 H. R. 973, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20 Id. 
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cites foreign law is another opportunity to set precedent 
and for the Constitution to be challenged and overrun.21    
Adams does not see the use of foreign law merely as different, or 
problematic.  Instead, Adams characterizes it as hostile to U.S. 
tradition and capable of harming society.  Foreign law, for Adams, 
is dangerous. 
Given the existence of these multiple normative battles, I argue 
that we are witnessing the social transformation of foreign law (a 
longtime, historically noncontentious concept) into a stranger—
specifically a dangerous stranger.  Upon cursory glance and given 
a general definition of strangeness, it might be easy for a consensus 
of society to think about foreign law as strange.  When a person or 
object is foreign, it by definition lacks autochthonism.  But 
foreignness and strangeness are not necessarily synonymous. 
This Article assumes that there is nothing natural about the 
existence of strangers, and that their presence is manufactured by 
individuals and groups interacting in society.  I argue that in 
resisting judicial reference to the citation of foreign authorities, 
conservative politicians and social movement organizations have 
worked to construct foreign law as a dangerous social stranger.22  
My goal is to understand normative arguments against the use of 
foreign law—arguments that never existed prior to the 21st 
century.  I hope to achieve this by analyzing these arguments using 
the sociological theories of the stranger. 
My argument is that the very nature of the debate is based on 
socially constructed categories that have no resonance in history or 
historical reference.  I believe that the foundation and framework 
that house the normative debate on the use of foreign law will 
shape its outcome.  Therefore, it is necessary to interrogate how all 
participants and society conceptualize the parameters of the 
debate.  The sociology of the stranger may illuminate this inquiry 
on foreign law, as it has been useful in better understanding the 
                                                     
21 Sandy Adams, ADAMS: Ban Foreign Law from Courts, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/9/in-recent-years-
supreme-court-justices-have-interj/. 
22 While I argue that strangers are socially constructed, I do not argue that the 
construction of strangers is necessarily deliberate, or that individuals and groups 
that construct the stranger are even cognizant or aware that they are involved in a 
social process that is constructing a stranger identity. 
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social lives and societal responses to foreigners and outsiders in a 
variety of settings.23 
Additionally, from a sociological and theoretical standpoint, 
the empirical example of foreign law as a site for observation may 
help push and advance the theory of the sociological stranger.  Can 
the concept be broadened to include the material products that 
people produce, as opposed to the people themselves?  Can the 
concept of the stranger be applied to non-material objects, like 
ideas?  Instead of talking about stranger relations, I argue that 
Georg Simmel’s original notion of the stranger and stranger 
relations can be deconstructed and broadened to discuss a 
generalized ‘strangeness’ that explains a wide variety of social 
interactions not solely limited to the stranger (interactions between 
people), but one that also includes strange things (interactions 
between people and cultural objects). 
This Article begins in Part 2 with a critical review of the 
sociological literature that theorizes the stranger.  I continue this 
inquiry by grounding theory in an empirical case study of senate 
judiciary confirmation hearings for nominees to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.  The high profile nature of these proceedings 
provides a great site to observe the political attempts and processes 
to transform foreign laws into strangers.  I discuss the methods 
used in designing the research study of confirmation hearings in 
Part 3.  In Part 4, I present my results where I analyze how legal 
and political elites understand and make meaning of foreign law.  
This Section illustrates the various framing techniques and 
conflicts that lead to the production of foreign law as a dangerous 
stranger.  These results are discussed in relation to the previous 
literature in Part 5, where I also touch on a theory of conflict that 
may offer a better explanation of strangers than a functionalist 
account.  Finally, I conclude briefly and offer thoughts for future 
research. 
2. THEORIZING THE STRANGER 
This Section critically reviews the relevant literature on the 
stranger in order to describe and better theorize the citation of 
foreign and international law in American society.  A key 
                                                     
23 See generally, Robert Ezra Park, Cultural Conflict and the Marginal Man, in 1 
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT EZRA PARK 372–76 (Everett Cherrington Hughes 
et al. eds., 1974); MARGARET MARY WOOD, THE STRANGER: A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS (1934). 
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component to this literature is that a stranger—or strangeness 
more generally—is a specific form of social interaction.24  
Therefore, this project seeks to understand how human interaction 
changes and affects the use of foreign law.  This Section proceeds 
with defining the sociological concept of the stranger, and seeks to 
understand the various cultural, functional, and structural reasons 
for the existence of the stranger. 
2.1. What Is a Stranger? 
Most sociological discussions of the stranger have their origins 
in Georg Simmel’s 1908 work called “The Stranger.”  At the heart 
of Simmel’s stranger is the notion of ambivalence and competing 
duality.  He writes that while the stranger may hold a meaningful 
place in the intimate personal relations of society, he is no 
“landowner” in the social environment.25  The stranger has the 
specific character of mobility and is therefore not fixed with respect 
to the origin of society.  Simmel writes: 
He is fixed within a certain spatial circle—or within a group 
whose boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries—but 
his position within it is fundamentally affected by the fact 
that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings 
qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to 
it.26 
The sociological literature on the stranger further develops the 
notion of the stranger’s duality at odds with itself.  Scholars 
describe the stranger as a being who operates on both sides of 
social borders.  The language used to describe strangers in main 
societies encompasses concepts linked to hospitality and hostility, 
and the stranger can act as a guest or an enemy, and at times 
                                                     
24 Simmel wrote that “[t]he state of being a stranger is of course a completely 
positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction.”  Georg Simmel, The Stranger, 
in GEORG SIMMEL: ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 143, 143 (Donald N. Levine 
ed., 1971). 
25 Simmel writes:  “Although in the sphere of intimate personal relations the 
stranger may be attractive and meaningful in many ways, so long as he is 
regarded as a stranger he is no ‘landowner’ in the eyes of the other.”  Id. at 145. 
Earlier in the essay, Simmel expands on his notion of the stranger’s landlessness, 
writing that “[t]he stranger is by his very nature no owner of land—land not only 
in the physical sense but also metaphorically as a vital substance which is fixed, if 
not in space, then at least in an ideal position within the social environment.”  Id. 
at 144. 
26 Id. at 143. 
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simultaneously serve as both depending on the social moment.27  
Beck writes that the “stranger has lost for himself the reference 
point of being here, of being at home.  There are natives and 
foreigners, friends and enemies—and there are strangers who do 
not categorically fit into this model, who dodge, obstruct, and 
irritate oppositions.”28  Bauman writes of such irritations when he 
says that “they [strangers] befog and eclipse the boundary lines 
which ought to be clearly seen.”29  We can think about 
communities as having boundaries that distinguish insiders from 
outsiders.  The insiders are positioned safely within the boundary, 
while the outsider exists beyond social boundaries.  The stranger, 
however, is located on the boundary.  Monterescu discusses the 
stranger as “located on the boundary between the group and what 
lies outside it.”30  But due to the ambivalent and mobile nature of 
the stranger, the stranger is not fixed on the boundary.  The 
stranger can cross boundaries and, in doing so, “defines and defies 
[community] boundaries, or builds bridges over them.”31 
2.2. Why the Stranger? 
2.2.1.  Functional 
Karakayali wisely asks the question “why are there 
‘strangers’?”32  Karakayali wants to understand what would 
motivate people to enter into relations that Simmel states is an 
unclear, ambiguous, twilight social position.33  Karakayali argues 
that instead of labeling individuals as strangers, it would be easier 
                                                     
27 See e.g., Rudolf Stichweh, Stranger, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY 599, 
599–600 (Austin Harrington et al. eds., 2006). 
28 Ulrich Beck, How Neighbors Become Jews: The Political Construction of the 
Stranger in an Age of the Stranger in an Age of Reflexive Modernity, 2 CONSTELLATIONS  
378, 383 (1996). 
29 Zygmunt Bauman, Making and Unmaking of Strangers, 43 THESIS ELEVEN 1, 1 
(1995). 
30 Daniel Monterescu, Stranger Masculinities: Gender and Politics in a 
Palestinian-Israeli “Third Space”, in ISLAMIC MASCULINITIES 123, 127 (Lahoucine 
Ouzgane ed., 2006). 
31 Tanya M. Cassidy, ‘Race to the Park’: Simmel, the Stranger and the State, 8 
IRISH COMM. REV. 14, 15 (2000). 
32 Nedim Karakayali, The Uses of the Stranger: Circulation, Arbitration, Secrecy, 
and Dirt, 24 SOC. THEORY 312, 313 (2006). 
33 Id. at 313. 
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to expel them from, or adopt them into, society.34  Partly relying on 
examples that Simmel provides, Karakayali offers a functionalist 
argument and states that strangers exist because “strangers often 
carry out special tasks that no one else in the group is capable of 
(or willing to) perform.”35  Karakayali identifies four functions, 
categorizing the stranger as a:  (1) circulator of items (i.e., goods, 
money, and information); (2) arbiter and resolver of conflict; (3) 
police or manager of secret/sacred domains; and (4) cleanser of 
group impurities, or performer of “‘dirty jobs.’”36 
While Karakayali’s functionalist argument provides valuable 
insight into understanding the role of strangers in society, there are 
two issues that limit its explanatory power.  First, the claim that 
adoption or expulsion might be easier alternatives doesn’t stand up 
to scrutiny.  Karakayali argues that maintaining a hybrid category, 
like a stranger, must provide some benefit to society because 
absorbing or expelling a group would “require much less ‘effort,’ 
much less institutionalization,” and would likely “lead to much 
fewer complications than stranger-relations.”37  To test this claim, 
one needs simply to consider opposition to undocumented 
Mexican immigration to the United States.  Mexican 
undocumented immigrants serve a beneficial function to the 
societies that they live and work in.38  Challengers of anti-
immigration policies often ask individuals to imagine the costly 
and inconvenient world if immigrant labor were removed from the 
economy.39  Following Karakayali’s thesis, it would be easier if we 
                                                     
34 Id.  Bauman addresses the same question, noting that nation-states 
deployed both anthropophagic (annihilation through the processes of assimilation 
and absorption) and anthropoemic (banishing through the process of exclusion 
and expulsion from the social world) strategies for dealing with modern 
strangers).  Bauman, supra note 29, at 2. 
35 Karakayali, supra note 32, at 313. 
36 Id. at 313.  In addition, Virnoche highlights Karakayali’s second use of the 
stranger, noting that the stranger can serve as one who can hold on to secrets, 
specifically, a “safekeeper of shared hopes, dreams and fears.”  Mary E. Virnoche, 
The Stranger Transformed: Conceptualzing [sic] On and Offline Stranger Disclousure 
[sic], 24 SOC. THOUGHT & RESEARCH 343, 344 (2002). 
37 Karakayali, supra note 32, at 313. 
38 See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UNIV. OF ARIZ. UDALL CTR. FOR STUD. IN PUB. POL’Y, 
IMMIGRANTS IN ARIZONA: FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS (2008), 
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/immigration/publications/impactofimmigrants0
8.pdf (assessing the impact of Mexican immigrants on Arizona’s fiscal health). 
39 See Dean E. Murphy, The Nation: A New Order; Imagining Life Without Illegal 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/ 
weekinreview/the-nation-a-new-order-imagining-life-without-illegal-
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either legally absorbed Mexican immigrants as permanent legal 
residents/citizens, or expelled them from the United States and 
deported them to Mexico.  Yet instead, we enter into stranger-
relations with them because they confer a benefit to society. 
Karakayali overlooks the empirical reality that adoption and 
exclusion might require so much effort that society cannot afford 
the price.  Integrating current immigrants into American society is 
costly.  Undocumented immigrants would need access to social 
services.  The granting of these social services might encourage 
more individuals to see the United States as a place for 
opportunity.  Expelling undocumented immigrants from the 
United States, while possible, would require intense police 
surveillance of borders and domestic immigrant communities and 
workplaces.  This intense border monitoring is extremely 
expensive.40  
The second limitation of Karakayali’s claim is situated in 
general critiques of the weakness of strict functional arguments.  
Functional arguments are criticized because they fail to account for 
social change, and they can be, in a sense, tautological.  For 
example, Karakayali’s account fails to explain why some 
immigrant groups with long histories in the United States (i.e., 
Mexicans) maintain stranger-relations, while other immigrant 
groups originally labeled as strangers (i.e., the Irish) were able to 
escape stranger-relations.  Understanding the function of the 
stranger is useful because it helps articulate the processes that lead 
to the continued existence of the stranger.  Yet, I believe that in 
order to understand the existence of the stranger and strange laws 
requires examining the structures and social conditions that enable 
their construction and production. 
2.2.2.  Structural/Social Construction 
While Simmel acknowledged the functional activities of the 
stranger, he suggests that this functionality is marginalized.  
Simmel’s work explores how structural forces produce the 
                                                     
immigrants.html (exploring American society without illegal immigrants).  Gans 
seeks to answer this question in the state of Arizona through simulated modeling.  
GANS, supra note 38, at 5. 
40 AMALIA GREENBERG DELGADO & JULIA HARUMI MASS, AM. C.L. UNION OF N. 
CAL., COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE HIGH PRICE OF POLICING IMMIGRANT 
COMMUNITIES (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/ 
police_practices/costs_and_consequences.pdf. 
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stranger.  He writes that strangers emanate from “a distinct 
structure composed of remoteness and nearness.”41  In an attempt 
to understand why strangers exist, Bauman highlights structural 
forces that work to create strangers, which complement functional 
explanations.  He writes that “[a]ll societies produce strangers; but 
each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and 
produces them in its own inimitable way.”42  Bauman argues that 
strangers are the by-product of the nation-state’s boundary 
drawing and are problematic because of “their capacity to befog 
and eclipse the boundary lines which ought to be clearly seen.”43 
Bauman distinguishes between modern and postmodern 
strangers.  He writes that: 
[t]he typical modern strangers were the waste of the state’s 
ordering zeal.  What the modern strangers did not fit was 
the vision of order.  When you draw dividing lines and set 
apart the so divided, everything that blurs the lines and 
spans the divisions undermines the work and mangles its 
products . . . .  Their mere being around interfered with the 
work which the state swore to accomplish, and undid its 
efforts to accomplish it.  The strangers exhaled uncertainty 
where certainty and clarity should have ruled.44   
Where modern strangers are the by-products of modernity’s 
attempt to order, postmodern strangers were the result of the 
ongoing and never-ending process of identity building.45  Bauman 
also adds that in our postmodern times, the boundaries that are 
both strongly desired and missed center around identity.  For 
Bauman, this centering around identity implicates the “rightful 
and secure position in the society, of a space unquestionably one’s 
own, where one can plan one’s life with the minimum of 
interference, play one’s role in a game in which the rules do not 
change overnight and without notice, act reasonably and hope for 
the better.”46 
Bauman agrees with Karakayali that there are two strategies 
that society can deploy with respect to strangers:  (1) to assimilate 
                                                     
41 Simmel, supra note 24, at 145. 
42 Bauman, supra note 29, at 1. 
43 Id. at 8. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45 Id. at 7–8.  
46 Id. at 8. 
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the strangers and transform them into insiders, or (2) to banish the 
strangers and exclude them as outsiders.47  However, Bauman 
identifies these strategies as responses to the modern stranger in 
societies’ attempts to maintain order and create boundary 
markers.48  The response to the postmodern stranger moves 
beyond assimilation and expulsion to a method of ongoing 
management.  In a postmodern world, the nation-state—being 
more concerned with the construction of identity as opposed to 
sheer order—cannot erase the stranger, and therefore employs a 
never-ending project where the stranger is invented and socially 
produced/constructed.49  The stranger is then used as a signal for 
the boundaries of what is acceptable with respect to identity.  
Bauman writes that  
the postmodern [strangers] are by common consent or 
resignation, whether joyful or grudging, here to stay.  To 
paraphrase Voltaire’s comment on God:  if they did not 
exist, they would have to be invented.  And they are indeed 
invented, zealously and with gusto, patched together with 
salient or minute and unobtrusive distinction marks.  They 
are useful precisely in their capacity of stranger; their 
strangerhood is to be protected and caringly preserved.  
They are indispensable signposts in the life itinerary 
without plan and direction.  They must be as many and as 
protean as the successive and parallel incarnations of 
identity in the never ending search for itself.50 
This structural-functionalist perspective identifies that while 
the stranger may hold some social function that benefits society, 
there are actors who perform work and are engaged in the 
production of strangers.  This work either creates the social 
conditions and structures for which a society can conceptualize a 
group of individuals as strangers (i.e., drawing boundaries of 
insiders/outsiders when groups exist that do not fit the binary 
distinction), or invents and constructs a group as a social stranger 
(i.e., via labeling and ongoing management practices) in pursuit of 
a specific function. 
                                                     
47 Id. at 2. 
48 Id. at 3. 
49 Id. at 8–9. 
50 Id. at 12. 
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2.3. Distinguishing Strangeness 
Marotta points out that there is a conceptual distinction 
between the stranger and strangeness.51  He writes that the notion 
of strangeness is linked to the spatial distance and proximity 
between social actors.  For Marotta, strangeness exists when social 
actors “who are physically close are socially and culturally 
distant.”52  Strangeness and an individual being constructed as a 
stranger may overlap, but it might not.  Marotta illustrates this 
point by arguing that young people—who aren’t considered or 
constructed as strangers—may experience strangeness while living 
in close proximity to their parents because they feel social and 
cultural distance due to differing values and ideas.53  What 
constitutes their strangeness can be tied to culture and described as 
the close proximity of their divergent cultural views. 
Alexander highlights the importance of culture in 
understanding the social construction of strangeness and takes 
issue with Simmel’s overemphasis on social structure.54  He argues 
that in order to understand strangeness, one must be aware of the 
cultural interpretation of social structures.55  He states that “it is the 
construction of difference . . . that makes potentially marginal 
groups into dangerous [strangers].”56  Alexander states that 
structural marginality alone doesn’t produce strangeness.57  He 
gives examples of the Protestant English who immigrated to the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in the first half of the 17th century who 
were “never convicted of strangeness.”58  While these immigrants 
underwent years of forced indentured servitude, they eventually 
became equal workers and citizens.59 
                                                     
51 Vince P. Marotta, The Cosmopolitan Stranger, in QUESTIONING 
COSMOPOLITANISM 105, 107 (Stan Hooft & Wim Vandekerckhove eds., 2010). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See Jeffrey C. Alexander, Rethinking Strangeness: From Structures in Space to 
Discourses in Civil Society, 79 THESIS ELEVEN 87, 91 (2004) (“[W]e must focus on the 
cultural interpretation of social structures and the categories within which these 
active interventions are made.”). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 92. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
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Stichweh reaffirms the possibility that culture may have a role 
in the production of strangeness.  He notes that even in the 
presence of foreigners, there are societies incapable of “recognizing 
strangers.”60  He points to a 1930s example where native New 
Guinea tribes identified foreign Australian gold prospectors that 
they unexpectedly encountered as returning tribe members.61  This 
is an example of a possible cultural interpretation of structural 
difference that didn’t lead to strangeness.  Even when foreigners 
are strangers, they don’t necessarily have to be conceptualized as 
dangerous.  In fact, Appiah believes the contrary and argues that 
valuable learning can occur via cosmopolitan exchange between 
strangers with different values, backgrounds, and norms.62 
Alexander states that if we are to understand what makes a 
stranger, we must look beyond the stranger’s structural position 
and examine how culture intervenes and allows the dominant 
group in society to assume a specific group occupies a place of 
strangeness.63  He writes: 
We discover that the employment of the language of 
strangeness creates the strangeness of a status, not the other 
way around.  This is not to deny that many and various 
social structural pressures come into play.  Imperialism 
may lead to the demand for rationalizing ideology; 
immigration may lead to the need to defend jobs; economic 
impoverishment may lead to renewed class conflict; 
military defeat or political instability may provide 
opportunities for new social actors to take power.  None of 
these factors, however, can, in and of themselves, specify 
who will be constructed as strange, or how.64 
If Bauman is correct, and we are in a postmodern moment 
where the ongoing construction of identity is of great social 
importance, then it might help us to think about expanding the 
                                                     
60 Rudolf Stichweh, Strangers in World Society – Indifference and Minimal 
Sympathy, in SCIENCE + FICTION: BETWEEN NANOWORLDS AND GLOBAL CULTURE 111 
(Stefan Iglhaut & Thomas Spring eds., 2004). 
61 Id.  
62 See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A 
WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006). 
63 For example, Alexander notes that the physical/structural segregation of 
Blacks in the U.S. did not precede white American’s cultural construction of Black 
strangeness.  See Alexander, supra note 54, at 93. 
64 Id. 
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idea of the stranger to not just think about stranger relations as 
social interactions solely between individuals, but to follow in the 
footsteps of Marotta and Alexander and think about the much 
broader concept of strangeness in an attempt to capture not only 
the individual and social interaction, but also those cultural 
artifacts—both tangible and intangible—that are key to the 
formation, composition, and production of social identity.  Other 
social theorists discuss strangeness and the stranger in a non-
human form, particularly with respect to technology and the 
transmission of information.65 
3. METHOD 
To understand the production of meaning surrounding the use 
of foreign and international law following the landmark Supreme 
Court rulings, this Article examines the senate judiciary 
confirmation hearings of nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
These hearings provide an active site where academic, legal, and 
political elites discussed the meaning and role of foreign law after 
their use became controversial in 2003.  The method used to 
analyze the hearings was a qualitative content analysis that 
searched for mentions of a judge’s use of foreign and international 
law. 
The method was systematic.  I gathered all of the available and 
searchable information on the Supreme Court nominee senate 
judiciary committee confirmation hearings.  Records were 
available for every nominee after 1971 with the exception of 
rejected nominee Robert Bork.66  I searched for the terms “foreign” 
and “international” in the available records of each nominee and 
found that mentions of foreign or international law with respect to 
judicial citation were present in the hearing transcripts of 
O’Connor (1981), Roberts (2005), Alito (2006), Sotomayor (2009), 
                                                     
65 See e.g., William Bogard, Simmel in Cyberspace: Strangeness and Distance in 
Postmodern Communications, 1 SPACE & CULTURE 23 (1999) (discussing the 
technology of cyberspace and computers as Simmelian stranger); Mary E. 
Virnoche, The Stranger Transformed: Conceptualzing [sic] On and Offline Stranger 
Disclousure [sic], 24 SOC. THOUGHT & RESEARCH 343 (2002) (arguing that 
telecommunications transforms social interactions between strangers and 
proposing the concept of stranger-making technologies that create remoteness 
and distance identified by Simmel). 
66 The list includes Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and the elevation of 
Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice. 
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and Kagan (2010).  This was not surprising because prior to 2003, 
the citation of foreign law was not a politically contested issue.  
The Roberts nomination was the first Supreme Court nomination 
to follow 2003. 
After identifying the text of the testimony relevant to this 
project, I coded.  Coding is the process of transforming “raw” data 
into a form that is standardized and able to be used in 
comparisons.67  Coding generates themes and a conceptual scheme 
for organizing the data and understanding meaning of the 
concepts—in this instance the citation to foreign authority—being 
observed and analyzed 
4. DATA/RESULTS 
The earliest mention of the use of foreign ideas in conjunction 
with the interpretation of American law in the senate confirmation 
hearings occurred in the testimony of a witness towards the end of 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s hearing.  Anne Neamon, the national 
coordinator for an organization called Citizens for God and 
Country, sought affirmation in the public record that nominee 
O’Connor was loyal to the “U.S. Constitution, Christian law 
priority.”68  Neamon expressed concern that “foreign ideology” 
had “illegally altered” and “misrepresented” the U.S. 
Constitution.69  She wanted the committee to question whether 
O’Connor would challenge the “status of plaintiffs whose policies 
advocate foreign ideological changes to our Constitution, such as 
some members of the left-thinking membership of ABA, ACLU, 
and others who propagate communistic worldwide atheism.” 70 
Contrasted to today’s political climate, Anne Neamon’s query 
about foreign influence on American law is interesting, given the 
fact that not one member of the committee raised this issue during 
O’Connor’s questioning.  This is evident in the following exchange 
between Neamon and the committee chairman: 
Ms. NEAMON.  Senator, since these matters were never 
brought out by any member of the committee, in justice to 
                                                     
67 For a discussion of coding qualitative data, see CARL F. AUERBACH & LOUISE 
B. SILVERSTEIN, QUALITATIVE DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO CODING AND ANALYSIS 
(2003). 
68 Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 385–86 (1981). 
69 Id. at 385. 
70 Id. at 386. 
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the national outcries, the moral crisis, and the President’s 
anxiety to restore U.S. Constitution and our ethics, could 
you find opportunity to address these questions to the 
nominee? 
The CHAIRMAN.  Well, you have made your statement.  
That will be available to all the Senators. 
Ms. NEAMON.  I wonder if they will find the time to really, 
collectively address it, and will the nominee have the 
opportunity to respond to their addressing of this matter? 
The CHAIRMAN.  Well, you see, the nominee now is through 
with her testimony, and it is too late to address questions in 
these proceedings. 
Ms. NEAMON.  Can she be recalled? 
The CHAIRMAN.  No; we cannot recall her.  We are giving 
everybody an opportunity.  We have had 3 days of 
hearings. 
Ms. NEAMON.  Thank you very much.  I would appreciate it 
if there was anything you could do to extend your 
concerns, at least. 
The CHAIRMAN.  Thank you very much.71 
Neamon’s presence at the senate judiciary committee gives some 
evidence that while probably a super-minority, there were some 
who thought, and sought to construct a platform, that foreign ideas 
had a negative effect on American law.  It is noteworthy that her 
particular framing of the issue was not publicly shared by any 
member of the senate judiciary committee, and that her views, 
while entered into the record, were given little publicity and no 
discussion.  Decades later, however, starting with the hearings for 
nominee John Roberts, a number of conservative senators would 
replicate Neamon’s framing of foreign ideas and begin questioning 
nominees’ views on the use of foreign law. 
Before examining how senators and witnesses use the political 
confirmation process to construct and contest frames surrounding 
foreign law, it is useful to understand the ways in which these 
actors agree.  Examining the points of convergence amongst 
adversaries illuminates the parameters of contestation and the 
                                                     
71 Id. at 387. 
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borders of group identity.  All of the actors gathered at the senate 
judiciary hearing agreed on a number of points, including the 
accepted and unacceptable uses of foreign and international. 
4.1. Shared Understanding/Agreement 
4.1.1.  Accepted Uses 
Conservative nominee Samuel Alito acknowledged that there 
are appropriate situations for a judge to use foreign law.  He said: 
There are other legal issues that come up in which I think it 
is legitimate to look to foreign law.  For example, if a 
question comes up concerning the interpretation of a treaty 
that has been entered into by many countries, I don’t see 
anything wrong with seeing the way the treaty has been 
interpreted in other countries.  I wouldn’t say that that is 
controlling, but it is something that is useful to look to. 
In private litigation, it is often the case—I have had cases 
like this in which the rule of decision is based on foreign 
law.  There may be a contract between parties and the 
parties will say this contract is to be governed by the laws 
of New Zealand or wherever.  So, of course, there, you have 
to look to the law of New Zealand or whatever the country 
is. 
So there are situations in litigation that come up in Federal 
court when it is legitimate to look to foreign law, but I don’t 
think it is helpful in interpreting our Constitution.72 
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick 
Leahy, cited to this quote by Alito years later in the questioning of 
liberal court nominee Elena Kagan, just after Senator Jon Kyl, a 
Republican conservative senator, questioned Kagan about the 
relevance of the use of foreign law: 
Senator LEAHY.  Incidentally, I have a quote here, there are 
other legal issues that come up in which I think it’s 
legitimate to look to foreign law.  For example, if a question 
comes up concerning the interpretation of a treaty that has 
                                                     
72 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370–71 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing]. 
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been entered into by many countries, I don’t see anything 
wrong with seeing the way the treaty has been interpreted 
in other countries and other—look at their foreign law.  I 
wouldn’t say that’s controlling, but it’s something that’s 
useful to look to.  That’s what Justice Salito [sic] said in his 
confirmation hearing.  I don’t recall anybody disagreeing 
with him.  Do you disagree with that? 
Ms. KAGAN.  No, that sounds right.73  
There also seems to be a consensus that does not object to the use 
of foreign law if it is constitutive of the origin of the U.S. legal 
system.  This is illustrated in the following exchange between 
nominee Alito and Senator Leahy:   
Judge ALITO.  Well, the Cruzan case proceeded assumed for 
the sake of argument, which is something that judges often 
do, that there is a constitutional right to say—that each of 
us has a constitutional right to say, ‘‘I don’t want medical 
treatment.’’  And the Cruzan decision recognized that this 
was a right that everybody had at common law.  At 
common law, if someone is subjected to a medical 
procedure that the person doesn’t want, that’s a battery and 
it’s a tort, and the person can sue for it.  It is illegal.  The 
Court did not— 
Senator LEAHY.  One of those cases where we got 
something from that foreign law, in this case English 
common law; is that correct? 
Judge ALITO.  Well, that’s correct, and I think that our 
whole legal system is an outgrowth of English common 
law. 
Senator LEAHY.  That popped in to my mind because I was 
thinking of some of the people talking about paying 
attention to foreign law.  Most of our law is based on 
foreign law.  But go ahead, common law. 
Judge ALITO.  Most of our common law is an outgrowth of 
English common law, and I think it helps to understand 
that background often in analyzing issues that come up.74 
                                                     
73 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 260–61 
(2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearing]. 
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Alito registers no problems with the use of foreign law like English 
common law because the U.S. legal system has its origins in this 
system, and therefore it might provide more information that 
could allow for a better interpretation of the American law on 
which it is based. 
4.1.2.  Unacceptable Uses 
There also seems to be overwhelming consensus amongst 
American judges that foreign law cannot be used as a form of 
precedent that acts as binding authority on U.S. courts.  In her 
confirmation hearings, Kagan noted that she did not think that 
foreign law held “any kind of precedential weight” and that it was 
not an “independent ground” for judicial decision-making.75  
Repeatedly throughout her confirmation, Sotomayor emphasized 
the norm that foreign law cannot be used as a source of precedent 
after Senators Coburn, Sessions, and Cornyn confronted her with 
the question of whether she would use foreign law.76  In her 
responses, Sotomayor made it clear that foreign law could not be 
used as a holding or as a source of binding precedent.  The 
following exchange between Sotomayor and Senator Coburn 
exemplifies her typical response: 
Senator COBURN.  So you stand by it.  There is no authority 
for a Supreme Court Justice to utilize foreign law in terms 
of making decisions based on the Constitution or statutes? 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  Unless the statute requires you or 
directs you to look at foreign law, and some do by the way, 
the answer is no.  Foreign law cannot be used as a holding 
or a precedent or to bind or to influence the outcome of a 
legal decision interpreting the Constitution or American 
law that doesn’t direct you to that law.77 
Sotomayor, along with all of the other nominees surveyed in this 
project, acknowledged clearly that foreign law was not a 
                                                     
74 Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 580–81. 
75 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 259. 
76 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 340–50, 396–97, 463–65 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor 
Hearing]. 
77 Id. at 349. 
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controlling authority.  No actor who participated in the hearings 
voiced a dissenting opinion. 
4.2. Otherness and Boundaries 
The social production of the stranger requires an important 
first step.  There must be some structural feature or border that 
distinguishes the insider/inner-boundary from some 
outsider/outer-boundary.  The data presented in this Section 
demonstrate how some conservative actors of the senate judiciary 
hearings use social structure and culture to place social distance 
between society and foreign and international law.  The goal of 
these actors is to push foreign law into the periphery.  If 
unsuccessful, these framings place foreign law closer to the 
insider/outsider border (or on the border) and transform it into a 
stranger.  This border may be inscribed on the stranger, or due to 
the stranger’s mobility and lack of fixity, the stranger may make us 
aware of the border (or be used to define the border) as the 
stranger moves back and forth across boundaries (or the 
boundaries are moved). 
4.2.1.  Proper Authority and the Constitution 
Throughout the hearings, Republicans characterized foreign 
citation as a practice without any support in the U.S. Constitution, 
domestic law, or the oath of office.  Because law does not offer any 
authority to use foreign law, then conservatives view the citation of 
foreign authorities as exceeding accepted boundaries.  Republicans 
developed and utilized this theme extensively in the questioning of 
Sotomayor.  In an exchange with the nominee, Senator Coburn 
said: 
You have taken the oath already twice and, if confirmed, 
will take it again.  And I want to repeat it again.  It has been 
said once this morning.  Here is the oath:  ‘‘I do solemnly 
swear or affirm that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich, and will faithfully and impartially discharge and 
perform all the duties incumbent upon me under the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States, so help me 
God.” 
It does not reference foreign law anywhere. . . . 
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I think this oath succinctly captures the role of a judge, and 
I am concerned about some of your statements in regard to 
that.  Your judicial philosophy might be—and I am not 
saying it is—inconsistent with the impartial, neutral arbiter 
that the oath describes.78 
Coburn clearly questions Sotomayor’s judicial philosophy as 
suspect and inconsistent with her duties as a judge.  As a result, 
Coburn argues that because the Constitution does not expressly 
reference and allow the use of foreign law, then it must therefore 
expressly forbid it.  Following Coburn’s perspective, Sotomayor’s 
advocacy for the use of foreign law is antithetical to the role of an 
impartial judge. 
In questioning nominee Kagan, Coburn repeats the idea that 
because the U.S. Constitution makes no reference to foreign law, its 
use is, therefore, forbidden. 
All right.  Let me read something to you.  As is obvious, I’m 
not a lawyer.  OK.  It’s pretty obvious.  But Article 3, 
Section 2 says this:  ‘‘The judicial power shall extend to all 
cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the 
laws of the United States, and the treaties made.’’ 
Nowhere—nowhere—in our Constitution does it give the 
authority for any judge, chief justice of the Supreme Court, 
any jurist on the Supreme Court, or any other court, to 
reference foreign law in determining the interpretation of 
what our statutes or our Constitution will be.  So this is an 
area where we have grasp, where our judicial majority, 
much like the Israeli judge, we start reaching beyond the 
Constitution.  You said it was all law.  You said the 
determination will always be law.  It’s down to law, law, 
law, the earliest questions that you were asked in this 
hearing.  Well, this is the founding document of what the 
law is.  Nowhere that I can find, in this writing or in these 
guys’ writing, says anything about using foreign law. 
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So please explain to me why it’s OK sometime to use 
foreign law to interpret our Constitution, our statutes, and 
our treaties.79 
Yet foreign origin does not necessarily equate into a person or item 
being an outsider or othered.  The Republican framing of foreign 
law works to situate foreign law as an outsider that is somehow, 
because of its origins, antithetical to the U.S. Constitution, laws, 
and traditions.  In this framing, there is no room for foreign law, 
despite its origins, to ever be contemporaneously and currently, a 
part of American law. 
4.2.2.  Disadvantaged Minority Status 
In addition to situating foreign law in opposition to the U.S. 
Constitution, another strategy that conservatives employed was to 
link foreign law to the outsider status of American disadvantaged 
social minorities.  During the hearings, disadvantaged minority 
identities—in the areas of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality—
were social attributes folded into the framing of foreign law as an 
outsider.  In the sole case of Sotomayor, conservatives established a 
connection between the social identity of the nominee and her 
advocacy for the citation of foreign law.  Specifically, there were 
attempts to link the subjectivity of her diverse ethnic and gendered 
background to a bias in the use of foreign law.  It was not 
                                                     
79 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 175–76.  Senator Coburn’s statement echoes 
a portion of a question posed to the nominee Alito during his hearing. Coburn 
said:  
And Article III, section 2 really delineates the scope for the courts in this 
country, and what it says is, “All cases in law and equity arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or 
which shall be made under their authority.”  So that really gives us the 
scope under Article III, section 2. I was interested when Senator Kyl 
asked you yesterday about foreign law.  That is something extremely 
disturbing to a lot of Americans, that many on the Supreme Court today 
will reference or pick and choose the foreign law that they want to use to 
help them make a decision to interpret our Constitution, where in fact, 
the oath of office mentions no foreign law.  Matter of fact it says the 
obligation is to use the United States law, the Constitution and the 
treaties, and that is exactly what Article III, section 2 says.  So there is no 
reference at all to foreign law in terms of your obligations or your 
responsibility, and matter of fact, the absence of it would say that maybe 
this ought to be what we use, and the codified law of the Congress and 
the treaties rather than foreign law. 
Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 470–71. 
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uncommon for the senators to discuss Sotomayor’s race and 
gender in the same breath as foreign law.  For example in opening 
statements, Senator Kyl said: 
Many of Judge Sotomayor’s public statements suggest that 
she may, indeed, allow, and even embrace, decision-
making based on her biases and prejudices. 
The wise Latina woman quote, which I referred to earlier, 
suggests that Judge Sotomayor endorses the view that a 
judge should allow gender, ethnic and experience-based 
biases to guide her when rendering judicial opinions.  This 
is in stark contrast to Judge Paez’s view that these factors 
should be set aside. 
In the same lecture, Judge Sotomayor posits that ‘‘there is 
no objective stance but only a series of perspectives.  No 
neutrality, no escape from choice in judging’’ and claims 
that ‘‘the aspiration to impartiality is just that.  It’s an 
aspiration,’’ she says, ‘‘because it denies the fact that we are 
by our experiences making different choices than others.’’ 
No neutrality, no impartiality in judging?  Yet isn’t that 
what the judicial oath explicitly requires? 
Judge Sotomayor. [sic] clearly rejected the notion that 
judges should strive for an impartial brand of justice.  She 
has already accepted that her gender and Latina heritage 
will affect the outcome of her cases. 
This is a serious issue, and it’s not the only indication that 
Judge Sotomayor has an expansive view of what a judge 
may appropriately consider. 
In a speech to the Puerto Rican ACLU, Judge Sotomayor 
endorsed the idea that American judges should use good 
ideas found in foreign law so that America does not lose 
influence in the world. 
The laws and practices of foreign nations are simply 
irrelevant to interpreting the will of the American people as 
expressed through our Constitution. 
Additionally, the vast expanse of foreign judicial opinions 
and practices from which one might draw simply gives 
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activist judges cover for promoting their personal 
preferences instead of the law. 
You can, therefore, understand my concern when I hear 
Judge Sotomayor say that unless judges take it upon 
themselves to borrow ideas from foreign jurisdictions, 
America is ‘‘going to lose influence in the world.’’  That’s 
not a judge’s concern.80 
Senator Kyl made sure not simply to highlight that he believed that 
Sotomayor was biased, but that she “accepted that her gender and 
Latina heritage” was the source of that bias.  In another instance, 
Senator Coburn, in his opening statement in the Sotomayor 
hearing, stated: 
Your assertion that ethnicity and gender will make 
someone a better judge, although I understand the feelings 
and emotions behind that, I am not sure that could be 
factually correct.  Maybe a better judge than some, but not a 
better judge than others. 
The other statement, there is no objective stance but only a 
series of perspectives, no neutrality, no escape from choice 
in judging—what that implies, the fact that it is subjective 
implies that it is not objective.  And if we disregard 
objective consideration of facts, then all rulings are 
subjective, and we lose the glue that binds us together as a 
Nation. 
Even more important is your questioning of whether the 
application of impartiality in judging, including 
transcending personal sympathies and prejudices, is 
possible in most cases or is even desirable is extremely 
troubling to me. 
You have taken the oath already twice and, if confirmed, 
will take it again.  And I want to repeat it again.  It has been 
said once this morning.  Here is the oath:  ‘‘I do solemnly 
swear or affirm that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich, and will faithfully and impartially discharge and 
perform all the duties incumbent upon me under the 
                                                     
80 Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 23. 
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Constitution and the laws of the United States, so help me 
God.’’ 
It does not reference foreign law anywhere.  It does not 
reference whether or not we lose influence in the 
international community.  We lost influence when we 
became a country in the international community to several 
countries.  But the fact is that did not impede us from 
establishing this great republic.81 
Conservatives like Coburn portrayed Sotomayor as a Puerto 
Rican woman holding racial, ethnic, and gender bias and linked 
this to discussions on the impropriety of using foreign legal 
sources.  In addition to the comments made by senators, George 
Mason professor Neomi Rao stated: 
[T]here is the related issue of the role of personal 
experiences in judicial decision-making.  It would be hard 
to deny that judges are human and made up of their unique 
life journeys.  Many judges recognize this and explain how 
they strive to remain impartial by putting aside their 
personal preferences. 
Judge Sotomayor’s position, however, has suggested that 
her personal background, her race, gender and life 
experiences, should affect judicial decisions.82 
One might argue that it was Sotomayor herself who established 
a connection between her gender and ethnicity and bias when she 
made the “wise Latina” comment referenced in Senator Kyl’s 
opening statement.83  The infamous comment was made in a 
speech that Sotomayor delivered at the University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law, where she stated:  “I would hope that a 
wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would 
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male 
who hasn’t lived that life.”84  Prior to the hearing, critics referred to 
                                                     
81 Id. at 39. 
82 Id. at 545. 
83 Id. at 18. 
84 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 
(2002). 
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the statement as racist and sexist.85  This assessment of Sotomayor’s 
bias can only be achieved by taking Sotomayor’s comment out of 
context.  The “wise Latina” comment was made while she was 
talking about the effect of social background on decision-making 
and the value of diversity in the judiciary. 
In addition, this linkage between social identity and bias could 
only be achieved by ignoring similar statements of other justices 
who relayed struggles based on social identity, albeit not 
specifically what we consider today as disadvantaged minority 
status.  For example, during his confirmation, Alito stated that his 
Italian heritage influenced his decision-making process.  In an 
attempt to rehabilitate the impression that Alito didn’t care about 
the less fortunate, Senator Coburn requested that Alito provide a 
comment that allowed the committee to “see a little bit of your 
heart.”86  Alito responded:  “When I get a case about 
discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family who 
suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or 
because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into 
account.”87  Senator Coburn did not subject Alito’s hearing 
statements to the same accusations of bias and subjectivity inflicted 
on Sotomayor. 
Highlighting the disadvantaged racial and gendered status of 
Sotomayor was not the only means that conservatives attempted to 
other foreign law.  Discriminatory responses to same-sex sexual 
orientation were also part of the narrative framing that senators 
used in their discussions of foreign law.  In his opening statement 
in the Roberts hearing, Senator Cornyn discusses the problematic 
nature of foreign law in conjunction with the elimination of the 
child death penalty in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.88  In the next 
breath, he mentions the Lawrence sodomy law decision. 
On what legitimate basis can the Supreme Court uphold 
State laws on the death penalty in 1989, then strike them 
down in 2005, relying not on the written Constitution, 
which, of course, had not changed, but on foreign laws that 
no American has voted on, consented to, or may even be 
                                                     
85 Morgan Weiland, Have Sotomayor’s Critics Actually Read Her Berkeley 
Speech?, MEDIA MATTERS (May 29, 2009, 8:15 PM), http://mediamatters.org/ 
research/200905290049. 
86 Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 475. 
87 Id. 
88 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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aware of?  When in 2003 the Court decided Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court overruled a 1986 decision on the 
constitutionality of State laws based on the collective moral 
judgment of those States about permissible sexual activity. 
What changed in that intervening time?  Did the 
Constitution change?  Well, no.  Did the Justices change?  
Yes.  But should that determine a different meaning of the 
Constitution?  Are some judges merely imposing their 
personal preferences under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation?  Indeed, this was the same case, as you 
know, Judge Roberts, that served as the cornerstone of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision holding that State 
laws limiting marriage to a man and a woman amounted to 
illegal discrimination.89 
Cornyn then linked the Lawrence decision to the state provision of 
same-sex marriage rights.  Senator Sessions explicitly linked his 
opposition to foreign law to the Lawrence sodomy law decision. 
Such vague standards provide the Court a license to 
legislate, a power the Constitution did not provide judges.  
Indeed, recently this license has led some judges to 
conclude they may look beyond American standards of 
decency to the standards of foreign nations in an attempt to 
justify their decisions.  The arrogant nature of this concept 
is further revealed by a Supreme Court ruling in 2003, 
when the Supreme Court explicitly declared that the 
Constitution prohibits the elected representatives of the 
people—us—from relying on established morality as a 
basis for the laws they pass.  The Court thus declares itself 
free to, in effect, amend the Constitution by redefining its 
words to impose whatever it decides is evolving standards 
of decency.  Yet at the same time, it prohibits legislatures 
from enacting laws based on objective standards of 
morality.90 
While Sessions did not acknowledge the Lawrence decision by 
name, there is no other 2003 Supreme Court ruling that involved 
issues of morality, American standards of decency, and the laws of 
                                                     
89 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
42 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing]. 
90 Id. at 30–31. 
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foreign nations.  It appears that the opposition to foreign law is 
rooted in an opposition to the expansion of rights to same-sex 
attracted men and women.  The senators in opposition to foreign 
and international law have not only othered foreign law, but 
grounded their opposition to foreign law to an opposition of 
disadvantaged domestic ‘others’—particularly homosexuals, as 
well as the racial and gendered othering of Sotomayor. 
4.3. Bias 
In addition to structurally identifying foreign and international 
law as an other, conservatives have also worked to infuse meaning 
into these boundaries of otherness.  Conservatives have 
constructed foreign laws as biased.  Republican members of the 
senate judiciary committee do major work in constructing the 
narrative that liberal judges are unobjective judicial activists who 
use foreign law in violation of their constitutional oath and without 
any recognized authority in order to legislate laws that meet their 
own biased goals.  Conservatives form this narrative of bias by 
linking judges’ use of foreign law to (a) judicial activism, (b) a 
reluctance to remain confined by domestic law, and (c) a desire to 
step outside of established authority and beyond their judiciary 
roles. 
4.3.1.  Judicial Activism 
One of the most prevalent ways that conservatives attempted 
to characterize the use of foreign law as a manifestation of bias was 
to shroud the practice in the decades old trope of judicial activism.  
Today, judicial activism popularly describes the decision making 
of judges who are willing to ignore precedent and allow their 
personal views to guide their decisions and find constitutional 
violations in democratically promulgated laws.91  Usually judicial 
activism is associated with politically liberal policy considerations.  
Senator Brownback discussed judges’ use of foreign law in 
                                                     
91 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (9th ed. 2009).  Other definitions of 
judicial activism are not linked to the manifestation of a personal bias within a 
judge, and instead describe how judges and courts use their power to impose 
decisions on other branches of government.  See e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 
THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z 236 (Kenneth Jost ed., 2d ed. 1998).  Despite the term’s 
prominence, the meaning of the term is obscure and has shifted through time.  For 
a more detailed conceptual and historical analysis of the term, see Craig Green, 
An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009). 
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association with a wide variety of contemporary political issues.  
He said: 
As I stated at Justice Roberts’s hearing, the Court has 
injected itself into many of the political debates of our day, 
and as my colleague Senator Cornyn has mentioned, the 
Court has injected itself in the definition of marriage, 
deciding whether or not human life is worth protecting, 
permitting Government to transfer private property from 
one person to another, even interpreting the Constitution 
on the basis of foreign and international laws. 
The Supreme Court has also issued and never reversed a 
number of decisions that are repugnant to the 
Constitution’s vision of human dignity and equality.  
Although cases like Brown v. Board of Education in my State 
are famous for correcting constitutional and court errors, 
there remain several other instances in which the Court 
strayed and stayed beyond the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States.  Among the most famous of these 
Supreme Court cases of exercise of political power, I 
believe, are the cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, two 
1973 cases based on false statements which created a 
constitutional right to abortion.  And you can claim 
whatever you want to of being pro-life or pro-choice, but 
the right to abortion is not in the Constitution.  The Court 
created it.  It created a constitutional right.  And these 
decisions removed a fully appropriate political judgment 
from the people of several States and has led to many 
adverse consequences.   
For instance, it has led to the almost complete killing of a 
whole class of people in America.  As I noted to my 
colleagues in the Roberts hearings, this year—this year—
between 80 to 90 percent of the children in America 
diagnosed with Down syndrome will be killed in the womb 
simply because they have a positive genetic test—which 
can be wrong and is often wrong, but they would have a 
positive genetic test for Down syndrome and they will be 
killed.92 
                                                     
92 Alito Hearing, supra note 72, at 46–47. 
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Brownback makes a judicial activist critique as he claims that 
the Court is working beyond its judicial role and is exercising more 
political power. 
Senator Mike DeWine aligned foreign law with judicial 
activism in the following statement: 
As of late, however, many Americans believe that the 
Supreme Court is unmaking the very Constitution that our 
Founders drafted.  Many Americans are concerned when 
they see the Court strike down laws protecting the aged, 
the disabled and women who are the victims of violence.  
Many Americans worry when they see the Court permit the 
taking of private property for economic development.  
Many are troubled when they see the Court cite 
international law in its decisions, and many fear that our 
Court is making policy when it repeatedly strikes down 
laws passed by elected members of Congress and elected 
members of State legislatures. 
I must tell you, Judge, I too am concerned.  Judges are not 
members of Congress.  They are not elected.  They are not 
members of State legislatures.  They are not Governors.  
They are not Presidents.  Their job is not to pass laws, 
implement regulations, nor to make policy.  Perhaps no one 
said this better than Justice Byron White.  During his 
confirmation hearing in 1962, White was asked to explain 
the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional form of 
Government.  Nowadays, in response to this type question, 
we probably would hear some grand theories about the 
meaning of the Constitution and its history. 
Justice White, however, said nothing of the kind.  When he 
was asked about the role of the Supreme Court in our 
system of Government, he gave a simple answer.  Justice 
White said the role of the United States Supreme Court was 
simply to decide cases. 
To decide cases.  So simple.  It sounds too obvious to be 
true, but, you know, I think that is the right answer.  Judges 
need to restrict themselves to the proper resolution of the 
case before them.  They need to avoid the temptation to set 
broad policy.  And they need to pay proper deference to the 
role of the Executive, the Congress, and the States, while 
closely guarding the language of the Constitution. 
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We would do well to keep this example in mind.  The 
Constitution does not give us all the answers.  It does, 
however, create the perfect process for solving our 
problems.  The Congress and the President have a role in 
this process, the States have theirs, and when there are 
disputes, the courts are there to decide cases. 
There is a reason that judges need to take on this limited 
role.  As my esteemed colleague from Iowa, Senator 
Grassley, explained during Justice Souter’s confirmation 
hearing, a judge should not be—and I quote—’’pro this and 
anti that.  He should rather be a judge of cases, not 
causes.’’93 
Senator Sessions stated: 
This result-driven philosophy of activism does not respect 
law.  It is a post-modern philosophy that elevates outcomes 
over law.  Today many believe the law does not have an 
inherent moral power and that words do not have and 
cannot have fixed meanings.  Judges are thus encouraged to 
liberally interpret the words to reach the result the judge 
believes is correct.  Activist Supreme Court judges have 
done this in recent years by saying they are interpreting the 
plain words of the Constitution in light of evolving 
standards of decency.  This phrase has actually formed the 
legal basis for a number of recent decisions.  But as a legal 
test, it utterly fails because the words can mean whatever a 
judge wants them to mean.  It is not objective, cannot be 
consistently followed, and is thus by definition not law, but 
a license.94 
The judicial activism label is problematic because it 
demonstrates bias, but also targets individuals to suggest they are 
willing to work outside the system to further that bias. 
4.3.2.  Domestic Constraints 
Republican members interpret and characterize the citation of 
foreign law not only as a reflection of bias, but also its enabler.  
Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation hearings stated that 
                                                     
93 Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 25. 
94 Id. at 30.  
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selection bias exists when judges search for foreign precedent.  He 
said: 
The other part of it that would concern me is that relying on 
foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges.  It doesn’t limit 
their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent 
does.  Domestic precedent can confine and shape the 
discretion of the judges. 
In foreign law you can find anything you want.  If you 
don’t find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the 
decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever.  As 
somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law 
for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out 
your friends.  You can find them, they’re there.  And that 
actually expands the discretion of the judge.  It allows the 
judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, 
cloak them with the authority of precedent because they’re 
finding precedent in foreign law, and use that to determine 
the meaning of the Constitution.  I think that’s a misuse of 
precedent, not a correct use of precedent.95 
This quote exemplifies how, during the hearings, conservative 
thinkers defined domestic law and precedent solely as objective 
boundaries with the power to confine judges.  Following this view, 
the meaning of domestic law has no subjectivity.  It is clear and 
unambiguous and not subject to multiple interpretations.  
Therefore, judges who disagree with a specific set meaning of 
domestic law are biased.  In order to implement their bias, 
however, these unobjective judges need a mechanism like foreign 
law to act as a precedent, which will authorize and strengthen their 
position.  Next, unobjective judges engage in a second round of 
bias (i.e., selection bias), and choose those foreign cases that affirm 
their positions. 
This conservative interpretation of the judicial use of foreign 
law does two things.  First, it assumes that domestic laws are 
objective and discrete and cannot be subjected to liberal 
interpretation.  As a result, all non-domestic laws are subjective 
and can only be used to further biased actions.  Second, this 
interpretation assumes that judges feel the need to ‘cloak’ and 
justify their biases using non-established foreign precedents in the 
                                                     
95 Id. at 201. 
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face of other options (i.e., characterizing their rationales and 
decisions as interpretations of established domestic precedent). 
4.4.   Danger 
In addition to framing foreign law as biased and othered, 
conservative senators went one step further to color the nature of 
the strangeness.  A distinct project—separate from the construction 
of the outsider—seeks to interpret foreign law as dangerous.  One 
can imagine the innocuous foreign outsider.  The senate judiciary 
confirmation hearings, however, reveal a framing of foreign law as 
a dangerous outsider not only unworthy of a judge’s time, but 
whose use actually debilitates the American legal system. 
The senators’ linking of foreign law to the concept of danger is 
present early in the Sotomayor hearing during Senator Sessions’ 
opening statement.  He said: 
[T]his hearing is important because I believe our legal 
system is at a dangerous crossroads.  Down one path is the 
traditional American system, so admired around the world, 
where judges impartially apply the law to the facts without 
regard to personal views. 
This is the compassionate system because it is the fair 
system.  In the American legal system, courts do not make 
the law or set policy, because allowing unelected officials to 
make law would strike at the heart of our democracy. . . . 
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where words 
have no true meaning and judges are free to decide what 
facts they choose to see.  In this world, a judge is free to 
push his or her own political or social agenda.  I reject that 
view, and Americans reject that view. . . . Judges have cited 
foreign laws, world opinion, and a United Nations 
resolution to determine that a State death penalty law was 
unconstitutional. 
I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted, I 
have to say, as a result of President Obama’s views that, in 
tough cases, the critical ingredient for a judge is the ‘‘depth 
and breadth of one’s empathy,’’ as well as, his word, ‘‘their 
broader vision of what America should be.’’96 
                                                     
96 Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 5–6. 
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It is not surprising that Sessions connects the use of foreign law to 
the biased, activist judge, but what is additionally noteworthy is 
that he characterizes this use as being located at a ‘dangerous 
crossroads’ that he fears will further corrupt the American legal 
system. 
In questioning nominee Roberts, Senator Kyl also attaches 
foreign law to a language of danger.  He said: 
I also think it would put us on a dangerous path by trying 
to pick and choose among those foreign laws that we liked 
or didn’t like.  For example, many nations have a weak 
protection for freedom to participate in or practice one’s 
religion.  Iran and some other Middle Eastern nations come 
immediately to mind, but even a modern western nation 
like France has placed restrictions on religious symbols in 
the public square.  That would be highly unlikely to pass 
muster in U.S. courts.  Should we look to France to tell us 
what the Free Exercise Clause means, for example? 
Even nations that share our common law tradition, such as 
Great Britain, offer fewer civil liberty guarantees than we 
do, and the press has far less freedom.  Nations such as 
Canada have allowed their judges to craft a constitutional 
right to homosexual marriage.97 
Senator Kyl points out that a judge’s method of selecting foreign 
law simply in terms of what he or she likes may have some type of 
bias.  However, this method of biased selection is not the sole (or 
primary) basis for his view that the use of foreign law can lead 
society “on a dangerous path.”  Kyl first notes the prevalence of 
countries that in the American imagination occupy the status of a 
Muslim religious otherness and then discusses how these Middle 
Eastern nations do not vigorously protect religious freedom.  Kyl 
then moves to France, a more developed, non-Muslim, “modern 
western nation” with a civil law history, and to other countries that 
share the common law tradition of the United States in order to 
demonstrate an American exceptionalism.  He argues that whether 
Muslim and developing, or modern and sharing our legal 
traditions, these countries offer fewer guarantees of liberty.  Kyl 
points to one example when a nation like Canada provides more 
civil liberties, i.e., the right to same-sex marriage, but does not 
                                                     
97 Roberts Hearing, supra note 89, at 200. 
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specifically put that in the context of nations offering fewer 
liberties.  Kyl’s statement places American exceptionalism with 
respect to the United States offering more civil liberties under a 
rubric of danger.  However, even when foreign nations offer more 
liberty, i.e., Canada and same-sex marriage, this practice is still 
linked to the concept of danger. 
4.4.1.  Diluted Meaning 
Conservatives argue that the use of foreign law is dangerous 
because it dilutes the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and 
weakens the civil liberties already recognized under the law.  In his 
opening statement in the Roberts hearing, Senator DeWine 
channels the great Chief Justice John Marshall to warn that the 
Constitution can somehow be “unmade” through international 
legal citations.  He stated: 
Former Chief Justice John Marshall once warned that, and I 
quote, ‘‘People made the Constitution, and people can 
unmake it.’’  It will be your job, in other words, to ensure 
that our Constitution is never unmade. 
As of late, however, many Americans believe that the 
Supreme Court is unmaking the very Constitution that our 
Founders drafted. . . . Many [Americans] are troubled when 
they see the Court cite international law in its decisions, 
and many fear that our Court is making policy when it 
repeatedly strikes down laws passed by elected members of 
Congress and elected members of State legislatures.98 
Senator Sessions also discusses how the use of foreign law 
dilutes the Constitution.  In an exchange with a witness, 
Georgetown Law Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz, during the 
Sotomayor confirmation hearing, Sessions said: 
I think the foreign law matter is a big deal to me.  Some 
people make out like it is nothing to this, this is just talk.  
But it is baffling to me how a person of discipline would 
think that foreign opinions or foreign statutes or U.N. 
resolutions could influence the interpretation of an 
American statute, some of which may be 1970, 1776. 
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I think you mentioned, Mr. Rosenkranz, that Americans 
revere the Constitution.  I remember at a judicial 
conference, 11th circuit, Professor Van Alstine said that if 
you respect the Constitution, if you clearly respect it, you 
will enforce it as it is written, whether you like it or not; if 
you don’t do that, then you disrespect it and you weaken it. 
And the next judge, someday further down the line, will be 
even more likely to weaken it further and just because you 
may like the direction somebody bent the Constitution this 
year in this case does not mean you are going to like it in 
the future, and our liberties then become greater at risk.99 
Sessions clearly links foreign law to the weakening of the 
Constitution and to risking the vitality of civil liberties. 
Senators were not the only figures at the confirmation hearings 
constructing foreign law as an agent of constitutional dilution.  
Hearing witnesses also played a role in this process.  For example, 
during the Kagan hearing, Ed Whelan, President of the Ethics and 
Public Policy Center, testified: 
Ms. Kagan would also provide the fifth vote to continue the 
court’s unprincipled practice of selectively relying on 
foreign law to alter the meaning of the Constitution, one 
part of a broader, transnationalist agenda that would 
displace the constitutional processes of representative 
government and dilute cherished constitutional rights to 
free speech and religious liberty.100 
While Rosenkranz doesn’t discuss the use of foreign law as 
diluting or weakening constitutional rights, he does link foreign 
law to a troubling alteration of the Constitution.  He stated: 
Those who would rely on such sources must be engaged in 
a different project.  They must be trying to update the 
Constitution to bring it in line with world opinion.  To put 
the point most starkly, this sort of reliance on contemporary 
foreign law must be, in essence, a mechanism of 
constitutional change. 
Foreign law changes all the time, and it has changed 
continuously since the Founding.  If modern foreign law is 
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relevant to constitutional interpretation, it follows that a 
change in foreign law can alter the meaning of the United 
States Constitution. 
And that is why this issue is so important.  The notion of 
the court ‘‘updating’’ the Constitution to reflect its own 
evolving view of good government is troubling enough.101 
4.4.2.  Anti-Democratic:  Destroys Democracy 
During the Alito confirmation hearing, Judge Alito and Senator 
Coburn expressed that the use of foreign law is dangerous because 
it undermines democracy.  Alito testified that “[i]t undermines 
democratic self-government and it is utterly impractical, given the 
diversity of legal viewpoints worldwide.”102  In addition to being 
anti-democratic, Coburn argued that foreign legal citation is a 
violation of the Constitution.  He stated: 
It actually undermines democracy because you get a pick 
and choose, and the people of this country do not get a pick 
and choose that law, as people from a different country.  So 
it actually is a violation of the Constitution, and to me, I 
very strongly and adamantly feel that it violates the good 
behavior, which is mentioned as part of the qualifications 
and the maintenance of that position.103 
If Senator Coburn’s analysis were correct, then the citation of 
foreign law could constitute a constitutional violation of a judge’s 
oath and lead to potential impeachment.  The hearings reveal 
multiple voices and contestations on this issue, however.  For 
example, in the Roberts hearing, Senator Coburn notes that the 
oath of office requires that a judge swear to perform his duties 
under the laws of the United States.  He then asks Roberts whether 
relying on foreign precedent, which he characterizes as inherently 
creating “a bias outside of the laws of this country,” constituted 
good behavior.104  Roberts responded: 
Well, I—for the reasons I stated yesterday, I don’t think it’s 
a good approach.  I wouldn’t accuse judges or Justices who 
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disagree with that, though, of violating their oath.  I’d 
accuse them of getting it wrong on that point, and I’d hope 
to sit down with them and debate it and reason about it. 
I think that Justices who reach a contrary result on those 
questions are operating in good faith and trying, as I do on 
the court I am on now, to live up to that oath that you read.  
I wouldn’t want to suggest that they’re not doing that.  
Again, I would think they’re not getting it right in that 
particular case and with that particular approach and 
would hope to be able to sit down and argue with it, as I 
suspect they’d like to sit down and debate with me.  But I 
wouldn’t suggest they’re not operating in good faith . . . .105  
Partially situated in a different, slightly less political sphere, 
Roberts does not mirror Coburn’s interpretation of foreign law as a 
violation of the Constitution or as a judge acting in bad faith.  
Roberts’s approach is to characterize the citation of foreign law as a 
misguided approach, and one worthy of conversation and debate.  
The distinction between the Roberts and Coburn approaches 
demonstrates that there is nothing inherently natural in the 
negative labeling of foreign law citation practices as a pariah.  
Roberts’s approach illustrates that a disagreement with the practice 
of foreign citation could elicit an alternate social response that does 
not attempt to ban or ostracize the practice.  Additionally, 
Roberts’s testimony also highlights that this process is not a simple 
dialectic contest between political legislators, where we have 
Democrats on one end of the spectrum who favor the use of 
foreign law and Republicans who are vehemently against the 
process on the other end.  Roberts shows us the existence of one 
additional dimension.  Nominees like Roberts, along with non-
political actors, illustrated that multiple actors’ viewpoints are 
constitutive of the process that makes judges and foreign law as 
strangers. 
Northwestern University law professor John McGinnis testified 
that the anti-democratic nature of foreign legal citation threatened 
to alienate citizens from the Constitution.  He said: 
My subject, the use of international and foreign law, is an 
issue of substantial importance, not least because the 
Supreme Court has come to rely on such material.  For 
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instance, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court recently 
relied on the European Court of Human Rights as part of its 
decision to strike down a statute of one of our states. 
In my view, such reliance distorts the meaning of our 
Constitution.  It undermines domestic democracy and it 
threatens to alienate Americans from a document that is 
their common bond.106 
In an exchange with nominee Sotomayor, Senator Cornyn 
described the use of foreign law as an attempt to circumvent the 
democratic process of constitutional amendment.  He said: 
I would just say if academics or legislators or anybody else 
who has got creative juices flowing from the invocation of 
foreign law, if they want to change the Constitution, my 
contention is the most appropriate way to do that is for the 
American people to do it through the amendment process 
rather than for judges to do it by relying on foreign law.107 
There are a number of reasons given why the citation of foreign 
law may undermine democracy.  Judge Alito stated that the 
process subverts democratic self-government because “it is utterly 
impractical, given the diversity of legal viewpoints worldwide.”108  
In this instance, Judge Alito is referring to the lack of a systematic 
method to survey and implement the wide variety of foreign laws 
available to U.S. judges. 
A second means that conservatives articulated as a reason why 
the foreign legal citation process subverted democracy was 
because the practice suffers from a democratic deficit and therefore 
goes against democratic theory.  During his hearing, Judge Roberts 
argued that: 
I would say as a general matter that a couple of things that 
cause concern on my part about the use of foreign law as 
precedent—as you say, this isn’t about interpreting treaties 
or foreign contracts, but as precedent on the meaning of 
American law.  The first has to do with democratic theory. 
Judicial decisions in this country—judges of course are not 
accountable to the people, but we are appointed through a 
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process that allows for participation of the electorate, the 
President who nominates judges is obviously accountable 
to the people.  The Senators who confirm judges are 
accountable to the people.  In that way the role of the judge 
is consistent with the democratic theory.  If we’re relying on 
a decision from a German judge about what our 
Constitution means, no President accountable to the people 
appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the 
people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in 
shaping a law that binds the people in this country.  I think 
that’s a concern that has to be addressed.109 
McGinnis further highlights the particular democratic deficits 
found in international law, noting that not only are the laws 
promulgated by unelected American officials, but that they are 
formed by totalitarian regimes and law professors.  He states: 
But raw international law also lacks any democratic 
pedigree and can cast doubt on our democratically made 
law.  Indeed, international law has multiple democratic 
defects.  Totalitarian nations have participated in its 
fabrication.  Very unrepresentative groups, like law 
professors, still shape its form. 
It’s also hardly transparent.  American citizens have 
enough trouble trying to figure out what goes on in 
hearings like this one, let alone in diplomatic meetings in 
Geneva.110 
Both Senator Coburn and Northwestern University law 
professor Stephen Presser discuss the perils of using law formed 
by institutions outside of the United States.  Coburn discusses the 
democratic deficit stating: 
We don’t want judges to have closed minds, just as much as 
we don’t want judges to consider legislation and foreign 
law that is developed through bodies, elected bodies 
outside of this country to influence either rightly so or 
wrongly so, against what the elected representatives and 
Constitution of this country says.111 
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Presser argues that while the use of foreign law might lead to 
“wise” results, a problem of the democratic deficit remains:  
To put it in the vernacular—and we talked about this—it’s 
the job of justices to judge, not to make law. In the past few 
years we’ve seen several instances of justices turning to 
international or foreign law to make American 
constitutional law.  Thus, Justice Kennedy, turning to the 
law of the European community, found support for his 
view, departing clearly from prior precedent, that 
consensual homosexual acts could not be criminally 
punished. 
In a similar manner, recent Supreme Court decisions, 
relying in part on European and other international 
authority, have decided that it is unconstitutional to apply 
the death penalty to minors and that it is unconstitutional 
to apply the death penalty to persons suffering from mental 
retardation. 
Now, the results in all of these cases might be wise social 
policy, but they all represent really legislative acts by the 
court.  In America, where the people are supposed to be 
sovereign, changes in such social policies are supposed to 
be for the popular organ, the legislature, or for the ultimate 
popular organ in action, amending the Constitution.112 
Presser links the democratic deficit issue to a larger problem 
where the citizens of the United States face a great danger via the 
loss of sovereignty to foreign nations.  The next Section explores 
how conservatives have employed the language of sovereignty in 
discussions of foreign law. 
4.4.3.  Sovereignty 
There was an incredible amount of testimony during the senate 
confirmation hearings that the citation of foreign and international 
law diluted U.S. sovereignty and subjected U.S. citizens to foreign 
authority.  These concerns surrounding sovereignty and 
governance were expressed most vehemently during the 
confirmation of Obama nominees Sotomayor and Kagan. 
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During the confirmation hearings for Kagan, Presser argued 
that while there is a historical precedent for the use of foreign law, 
the use of recent precedents diminishes sovereignty.  He stated: 
In the early years of our Republic and subsequently, judges 
and justices have quite properly sought to understand and 
apply the Law of Nations, a body of super-constitutional 
principles that apply to every nation and that have been the 
subject of work by international scholars for hundreds of 
years. 
But this recourse to the ancient Law of Nations, this 
traditional recourse to international law, is very different 
from turning to recent international or foreign 
jurisprudence to implement policies and rules, very 
different from those previously prevailing.  One is a 
longstanding legitimate use of international authority, the 
other is a usurpation of the sovereignty of the people.113  
Presser focuses on a particular type of popular sovereignty. 
Senator Sessions also links the citation of foreign law to disrupting 
popular sovereignty when discussing the governance of the 
American people: 
Foreign law, that’s a ranging [sic] debate within our 
country today.  
I do not see how anyone can justify a citation to actions 
outside the country as any authority whatsoever to define 
what Americans have done.  Americans believe that you 
only govern with the consent of the governed and we have 
not consented to be governed by Europe or any other 
advanced nation.114 
Nicholas Rosenkranz describes how through the citation of 
foreign law, foreign governments can control American law.  He 
testified: 
When the Supreme Court declares that the Constitution 
evolves—and it declares further that foreign law may affect 
its evolution—it is declaring nothing less than the power of 
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foreign governments to change the meaning of the United 
States Constitution. 
And even if the court purports to seek a foreign 
‘‘consensus,’’ a single foreign country might tip the scales. 
Indeed, foreign governments might even attempt this 
deliberately.  France, for example, has declared that one of 
its priorities is the abolition of capital punishment in the 
United States.  Yet surely the American people would rebel 
at the thought of the French Parliament deciding whether 
to abolish the death penalty—not just in France, but also 
thereby, in America. 
After all, foreign control over American law was a primary 
grievance of the Declaration of Independence.  It, too, may 
be found at the National Archives, and its most resonant 
protest was that King George III had ‘‘subject[ed] us to a 
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.’’ 
This is exactly what is at stake here—foreign government 
control over the meaning of our Constitution.  Any such 
control, even at the margin, is inconsistent with our basic 
founding principles of democracy and self-governance.115 
Rosenkranz constructs an ominous scenario where foreign 
governments intentionally try to influence the laws of the United 
States.  He also analogizes, and therefore connects, contemporary 
citations to foreign law to a history of U.S. resistance to foreign 
control that dates back to the U.S. Declaration of Independence 
from England. 
Rosenkranz’s link between the guiding nature of contemporary 
foreign law and the overt control of foreign governments prior to 
the American Revolution is further articulated in an exchange 
between Presser and Sessions during the expert testimony phase of 
Kagan’s confirmation hearing: 
[Senator SESSIONS.]  Professor Presser, I think that this 
international law issue is important because Americans 
believe they should not be controlled by anyone that they 
don’t elect to represent them, or getting taxation without 
representation.  How can we have our law controlled, 
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defined, or modified, or influenced by some parliament in 
Belgium or some potentate somewhere in the world? 
Mr. PRESSER.  You’re absolutely right.  We fought a revolution  
over that and I don’t think we can let ourselves be guided by  
some foreign bodies or some foreign emerging law.  I only wish  
you had had a little bit clearer answers perhaps from General  
Kagan on that point.  I think it’s one that you have to be very  
concerned about.116  
4.5.  Learning 
A debate exists surrounding the citation of foreign and 
international law and whether this can serve as a site for learning 
and as a source for “good ideas.”117  This issue surrounding 
learning serves as a battlefront where those in favor of the use of 
foreign law have chosen to fight.  While opponents to the use of 
foreign law point out that foreign law is not a useful source for 
learning due to its dangerous and biased aspects, proponents 
combat this narrative, arguing that foreign law is not only safe, but 
that it is no different from other nonbinding, noncontroversial 
sources of knowledge that benefit the legal decision-making 
process. 
Opponents argue in hearings that foreign laws do not offer any 
benefits in the interpretation of U.S. law.  The following exchange 
between Senator Sessions and nominee Alito illustrates this point: 
Senator SESSIONS.  As you analyze how to interpret the 
Constitution of the United States or a statute passed by the 
U.S. Congress, do you believe that authoritative insight can 
be obtained by reading the opinions of the European 
Union? 
Judge ALITO.  I don’t.  I don’t think that it’s very helpful—
in fact, I don’t think it is helpful to look at the decisions of 
foreign courts for the interpretation of our Constitution.  I 
think we can do very well with our own Constitution and 
our own judicial precedents and our own traditions.  And I 
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don’t say that with disrespect to the other countries.  But I 
don’t think that there are insights to be provided on issues 
of American constitutional law by examining the decisions 
of foreign courts. 
I think that it’s very interesting from a political science 
perspective to see what they’ve done, and I’ve personally 
been interested in this over the years.  And I think it’s 
flattering to us that so many other countries have followed 
our judicial traditions.  But on issues of interpretation of 
our Constitution, I don’t think that that’s useful.118 
Alito points to serious concerns and questions for the learning 
paradigm to grapple with.  He raises issues of selection bias 
mentioned earlier, but he also brings up the question of 
understanding these decisions.  He adds: 
I also don’t think that it’s—I think that it presents a host of 
practical problems that have been pointed out.  You have to 
decide which countries you are going to survey, and then it 
is often difficult to understand exactly what you are to 
make of foreign court decisions.  All countries don’t set up 
their court systems the same way.  Foreign courts may have 
greater authority than the courts of the United States.  They 
may be given a policymaking role, and therefore, it would 
be more appropriate for them to weigh in on policy issues. 
When our Constitution was being debated, there was a 
serious proposal to have members of the judiciary sit on a 
council of revision, where they would have a policymaking 
role before legislation was passed, and other countries can 
set up their judiciary in that way.  So you’d have to 
understand the jurisdiction and the authority of the foreign 
courts. 
And then sometimes it’s misleading to look to just one 
narrow provision of foreign law without considering the 
larger body of law in which it’s located.  That can be—if 
you focus too narrowly on that, you may distort the big 
picture, so for those reasons, I just don’t think that’s a 
useful thing to do.119 
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A lengthy exchange between Senator Cornyn and nominee 
Sotomayor revealed the senator’s concern over issues of 
sovereignty. 
Senator CORNYN. I appreciate that.  You testified earlier 
today that you would not use foreign law in interpreting 
the Constitution and statutes.  I would like to contrast that 
statement with an earlier statement that you made back in 
April, and I quote, ‘‘International law and foreign law will 
be very important in the discussion of how to think about 
unsettled issues in our legal system.  It is my hope that 
judges everywhere will continue to do this.’’ 
Let me repeat the words that you used 3 months ago.  You 
said ‘‘very important’’ and you said ‘‘judges everywhere.’’ 
This suggests to me that you consider the use of foreign law 
to be broader than you indicated in your testimony earlier 
today.  
Do you stand by the testimony you gave earlier today, do 
you stand by the speech you gave 3 months ago, or can you 
reconcile those for us? 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  Stand by both, because the speech 
made very clear, in any number of places, where I said you 
can’t use it to interpret the Constitution or American law.  I 
went through—not a lengthy, because it was a shorter 
speech, but I described the situations in which American 
law looks to foreign law by its terms, meaning it’s 
counseled by American law. 
My part of the speech said people misunderstand what the 
word ‘‘use’’ means and I noted that ‘‘use’’ appears to 
people to mean if you cite a foreign decision, that means it’s 
controlling an outcome or that you are using it to control an 
outcome, and I said no. 
You think about foreign law as a—and I believe my words 
said this.  You think about foreign law the way judges think 
about all sources of information, ideas, and you think about 
them as ideas both from law review articles and from state 
court decisions and from all the sources, including 
Wikipedia, that people think about ideas.  Okay. 
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They don’t control the outcome of the case.  The law 
compels that outcome and you have to follow the law.  But 
judges think.  We engage in academic discussions.  We talk 
about ideas. 
Sometimes you will see judges who choose—I haven’t, it’s 
not my style, but there are judges who will drop a footnote 
and talk about an idea.  I’m not thinking that they’re using 
that idea to compel a result.  It’s an engagement of thought. 
But the outcome—you could always find an exception, I 
assume, if I looked hard enough, but in my review, judges 
are applying American law.120 
Sotomayor tries to alleviate these fears of sovereignty by 
stating that it is American law, not foreign law, that is controlling, 
and that foreign law serves solely as a learning tool for the judge. 
In the following passage, Cornyn intimates that while foreign law 
might not be controlling, that even in a persuasive way, it has some 
impact on a judge’s decision-making process. 
Senator CORNYN. Your Honor, why would a judge cite 
foreign law unless it somehow had an impact on their 
decision or their decision-making process? 
Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know why other judges do it.  
As I explained, I haven’t.  But I look at the structure of what 
the judge has done and explains and go by what that judge 
tells me.  There are situations—that’s as far as I can go.121 
Cornyn seems to create a very high bar in that any idea that has an 
impact on a judge’s thinking can somehow have an effect on 
sovereignty.  Sotomayor reiterates the nonbinding nature of 
foreign legal citations and again associates it with the process of 
legal knowledge production (and perhaps legal innovation)122 
when discussing foreign law with respect to “creative juices.”123 
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Senator CORNYN.  You said, at another occasion, that you 
find foreign law useful because it ‘‘gets the creative juices 
flowing.’’  What does that mean? 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  To me, I am a part academic.  Please 
don’t forget that I taught at two law schools.  I do speak 
more than I should and I think about ideas all the time. 
And so for me, it’s fun to think about ideas. 
You sit in a lunchroom among judges and you’ll often hear 
them say, ‘‘Did you see what that law school professor 
said’’ or ‘‘did you see what some other judge wrote and 
what do you think about it,’’ but it’s just talking.  It’s 
sharing ideas. 
What you’re doing in each case, and that’s what my speech 
said, is you can’t use foreign law to determine the 
American Constitution.  It can’t be used either as a holding 
or precedent.124 
Sotomayor’s reference to foreign law as a source of good ideas 
arose repeatedly during her and Kagan’s confirmation hearings.  In 
an exchange with Senator Coburn, nominee Sotomayor explained 
her “good ideas” statement and her position on how foreign law 
could serve as a source of knowledge.  She testified that judges do 
not use foreign law to come to a legal conclusion, but instead, 
[w]hat judges do, and I cited Justice Ginsburg, is educate 
themselves.  They build up a story of knowledge about 
legal thinking, about approaches that one might consider. 
But that is just thinking.  It’s an academic discussion when 
you’re talking about thinking about ideas.  Then it is how 
most people think about the citation of foreign law in a 
decision. 
They assume that if there is a citation to foreign law, that is 
driving the conclusion.  In my experience when I have seen 
other judges cite foreign law, they are not using it to drive 
the conclusion, they are using just to point something out 
about a comparison between American law or foreign law. 
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But they are not using it in the sense of compelling a 
result.125 
Professor McGinnis, however, critiqued this educational 
learning function of foreign law.  He stated: 
Foreign and international law may well contain good ideas, 
as Justice Sotomayor suggested, but so many other sources 
that have no weight and should not, I think, routinely be 
cited as authority. 
To put the question in perspective, undoubtedly, the Bible 
and the Quran have many legal ideas that many people 
think are good, but we would be rightly concerned if judges 
used them as guidance for interpreting the Constitution or 
even routinely cited them. 
Depending on what text the judge cited and what she 
omitted, we might think she was biased in favor of one 
tradition at the expense of others.126 
McGinnis chose an extremely limited religious perspective in 
citing ‘problematic’ sources of good ideas.  The democratic 
nominees and democratic senators framed the debate in a slightly 
different manner and compared foreign and international legal 
sources to other well-accepted, non-binding sources of knowledge.  
One popular source that proponents of foreign law referred to 
repeatedly was the academic law review article.  When Senator 
Grassley asked nominee Kagan whether judges should ever use 
foreign law for “good ideas,”127 she said: 
Well, Senator Grassley, I guess I’m in favor of good ideas 
coming from wherever you can get them, so in that sense I 
think for a judge to read a Law Review article or to read a 
book about legal issues or to read the decision of a State 
court, even though there’s no binding effect of that State 
court, or to read the decision of a foreign court, to the extent 
that you learn about how different people might approach 
and have thought about approaching legal issues.  But I 
don’t think that foreign law should have independent 
                                                     
125 Id. at 349. 
126 Id. at 548. 
127 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 126. 
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precedential weight in any but a very, very narrow set of 
circumstances. 
So I would draw a distinction between looking wherever 
you can find them for good ideas, for just to expand your 
knowledge of the way in which judges approach legal 
issues, but—but making that very separate from using 
foreign law as precedent or as independent weight. 
Fundamentally, we have an American Constitution.  Our 
Constitution is our own. 
It’s the text that we have been handed down from 
generation to generation, it’s the precedents that have 
developed over the course of the years.  And except with 
respect to a very limited number of issues, that Constitution 
ought to—the fundamental sources of legal support and 
legal argument for that Constitution ought to be 
American.128 
For Kagan, “good ideas” can come from a variety of sources, 
and she implies that citation to foreign law is not much different 
than citation to an academic law review article.129  Like Sotomayor, 
Kagan explicitly confronts concerns regarding legal sovereignty 
and iterates that the U.S. Constitution and American law is 
fundamental and controlling.  In a question and answer session 
with Senatory Kyl, nominee Kagan highlights sensitivity to U.S. 
sovereignty while clarifying the comparison between law reviews 
and foreign law in the following quote: 
Senator Kyl, I do believe that this is an American 
Constitution.  That one interprets it by looking at the 
structure, our own history, and our own precedents.  And 
that foreign law does not have precedential weight. 
                                                     
128 Id. at 126–27. 
129 Sotomayor made a similar comparison between foreign law and law 
review articles in an exchange with Senator Schumer.  She stated:  
The question of use of foreign law then is different than considering the 
idea that it may, on an academic level, provide.  Judges—and I’m not 
using my words.  I’m using Justice Ginsberg’s words.  You build up your 
story of knowledge as a person, as a judge, as a human being with 
everything you read.  For judges, that includes law review articles and 
there are some judges who have opined negatively about that.  You use 
decisions from other courts.  You build up your story of knowledge. 
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 133. 
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Now, in the same way that a judge can read a Law Review 
article and say, well, that’s an interesting perspective or I 
learned something from it, I think that so too a judge may 
read a foreign judicial decision and say, well, that’s an 
interesting perspective, I learned something from it.130 
One member of the judiciary committee, Senator Schumer, 
performed work in constructing the use of foreign law as benign.  
Schumer made a comparison between the non-binding use of 
foreign law and law review articles in a question to nominee 
Kagan.  He asked: 
Senator SCHUMER.  OK.  And of course when an American 
judge considers, they consider many non-binding sources 
when they reach a determination. 
I asked this of Judge Sotomayor because it came up then. 
Judge Roberts’ prominent citation in a voting rights act case 
decided last year, Justice Roberts, he cited an article by 
NYU Professor Samuel Isacaroff published in the Columbia 
Law Review. 
Would you agree that Law Review articles are not binding 
on American judges even though they might be cited by 
some? 
MS. KAGAN. Some law professors would like them to be 
binding, but no.  I agree, Senator Schumer, that the way 
they are cited in these decisions are just, this isn’t binding, 
this isn’t precedent, but this is a person who had a good 
idea and the decision in some sense cites or reflects that. 
Senator SCHUMER.  And it sure wasn’t improper of the 
Chief Justice to consider such sources in reaching his 
decision, was it? 
MS. KAGAN.  Absolutely not.131 
Senator Schumer continued to ask both nominees Sotomayor 
and Kagan about other non-binding sources of knowledge that 
judges used without controversy, specifically Justice Scalia’s use of 
dictionaries in his decision-making process.  In an exchange with 
nominee Sotomayor, Senator Schumer asked: 
                                                     
130 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 258. 
131 Id. at 156. 
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Senator SCHUMER.  Right, and it is important.  American 
judges consider many non-binding sources when reaching 
a determination.  For instance, consider Justice Scalia’s well 
known regard for dictionary definitions in determining the 
meaning of words or phrases or statutes being interpreted 
by a court. 
In one case, MCI v. AT&T, that is a pretty famous case, 
Justice Scalia cited not one, but five different dictionaries to 
establish the meaning of the word ‘‘modify’’ in a statute. 
Would you agree that dictionaries are not binding on 
American judges? 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  They are a tool to help you in some 
situations to interpret what is meant by the words that 
Congress or a legislature uses. 
Senator SCHUMER.  Right.  So it was not improper for Justice 
Scalia to consider dictionary definitions, but they are not 
binding, same as citing of foreign law, as long as you do not 
make it binding on the case. 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  Yes.  Well, foreign law, except in the 
situation—— 
Senator SCHUMER.  Of treaties. 
Judge SOTOMAYOR.  —which we spoke about and even then 
is not binding.  It’s American principles of construction that 
are binding.132 
Senator Schumer repeated this reference to Justice Scalia’s use 
of five different dictionaries in an attempt to establish the meaning 
of the word “modify” in a statute during the hearing for Solicitor 
General Kagan.133  His goal was to argue “that American judges of 
all ideological stripes keep their minds open to sources and ideas 
other than those that are directly binding on them under the 
constitution and the laws of the United States,” and that foreign 
and international law was just one iteration of an idea source.134 
                                                     
132 Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 76, at 133. 
133 Kagan Hearing, supra note 73, at 156.  The particular case to which Senator 
Schumer was referring was MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
134 Id. at 156. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
This qualitative study reveals that politicians—specifically 
senators—are engaged in the production of strangeness and the 
transformation of foreign law into a stranger.  This Article has tried 
to illustrate the process by which foreign and international laws 
have become strangers in the United States—or how those who are 
engaged in the process of using foreign laws are seen as strange, or 
as engaged in strangeness/strange activity. 
The data reveal a variety of cultural, functional, and structural 
origins to strange laws.  This project takes a conflict analysis 
approach by examining how individuals contest the meaning and 
use of foreign and international law during the senate confirmation 
hearings.  First, those who oppose the use of foreign law seek to 
demonstrate that it is somehow structurally different than U.S. 
domestic law.  One might argue that one does not need to 
demonstrate or construct this reality because U.S. domestic law 
and foreign law, by definition of their origin, are structurally 
different.  However, simply because they are different doesn’t 
mean that their difference has salience or any particular social 
meaning.  Opponents of foreign law construct these differences of 
origin into having some meaning of outsider status or social 
otherness.  This occurs when Republican senators imply that 
foreign law goes against the tradition of the U.S. Constitution and 
is not allowed by U.S. law.  The structural difference of foreign law 
is further infused with meaning when it is linked to the biased and 
counter-majoritarian desires believed to be present and 
represented by the disadvantaged, minority-identity statuses of 
Sonia Sotomayor and the homosexual male litigants in Lawrence.  
Secondly, conservative opponents of foreign law go an extra step 
and frame their conceptualization of the othered nature of foreign 
law as biased and dangerous.  They argue that foreign laws are 
vehicles for judicial activism, threaten American sovereignty, and 
are anti-democratic. 
The data that this project presents illustrate an ongoing issue 
contested in the senate judiciary confirmation hearings starting in 
2005 with the nomination of John Roberts, continuing to 2010 with 
the nomination of Elena Kagan.  It is not clear whether a functional 
theory is useful in explaining the existence of strangers, or if their 
status is merely the result of a battle between political and legal 
elites.  Does society create strangers in order to fulfill particular 
needed roles?  Or are they the by-products of conflicts that result 
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when different political and legal groups work to create a just, 
functioning, society? 
Society has three strategies for dealing with outsiders:  (1) 
absorption and assimilation, (2) expulsion or banishment, or (3) 
entering into hybrid stranger relations.135  Both Karakayali and 
Bauman present somewhat functionalist accounts for entering into 
stranger relations.  Karakayali offers a strict functionalist account 
and illustrates the various ways that strangers are useful to 
society.136  Bauman combines a functionalist theory with a 
structural explanation.137  According to Bauman, in a postmodern 
world, society has no desire to absorb the outsider, yet because of 
structural limitations, is simply unable to erase and eradicate the 
outsider.138  Therefore, society enters an on-going, never-ending 
project where the stranger is perpetually constructed and serves 
the function of signaling the boundaries of what is acceptable in 
society. 
Functionalist accounts of the postmodern stranger (even ones 
with structural underpinnings) are problematic.  First, it may be an 
oversimplification to characterize the presence of the stranger as 
the product of an ongoing, monolithic, society-wide management 
process.  Instead, it might be more accurate (and useful) to imagine 
the stranger as the by-product of the contestation between 
multiple, powerful societal insiders fighting to determine whether 
a group or thing will hold insider or outsider status in society.  
Secondly, Bauman fails to illuminate the mechanisms and social 
processes that create the postmodern stranger, in part because he 
engages in feckless futility arguments, which hold that postmodern 
society is unable to eradicate the outsider (and therefore society 
enters into an ongoing process of constructing the foreigner as a 
stranger).  This view relies on two great assumptions:  (1) a group 
(or thing) linked to identity in a postmodern society cannot be 
erased or eradicated from society,139 and (2) the social construction 
                                                     
135 See supra Part 2. 
136 See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
137 See Bauman, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
139 Bauman argues that the postmodern stranger cannot be expelled, erased, 
eradicated or banished from society.  Bauman, supra note 29, at 12.  This type of 
futility argument ignores the possibility of social change.  The data from this 
project revealed significant changes simply in the framing of foreign and 
international law in the more than two decades that separated the O’Connor and 
Roberts hearings.  If one focuses specifically on the lack of formal/legal (i.e., 
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of the postmodern stranger is somehow linked to a large, group 
social consciousness where society is either aware, has knowledge, 
or can at least understand that the eradication of the outsider is 
impossible. 
The data from the senate judiciary committee hearings may 
help generate a more complex understanding of the production of 
strangers in a postmodern world.  First, it is not clear from the data 
that the senators are engaged in an ongoing management process 
that consciously tries to transform foreign law into a dangerous 
stranger.  The hearings reveal a complex socio-legal political world 
where judges, legislators, academics, and policy activists debate 
the proper role of the citation and use of foreign and international 
law.140  In this complex world, multiple members, not one 
conservative arm of the nation-state, are responsible for producing 
the foreign legal stranger.  This contested process is constituted on 
a number of different scales (i.e., state and national) in multiple 
spheres (political, government, judicial, academic, non-profit 
activist), and comprised of a variety of actors of disparate political 
persuasions and ideologies.  The debate surrounding the role of 
foreign law is so complex that it does not merely exist on a 
conservative/liberal political ideology scale.  One must also 
consider conservative/liberal ideology on a judicial scale.  For 
example, while liberal judges’ foreign citation practices are 
criticized by their conservative judicial counterparts, conservative 
judges take an approach different than conservative legislators and 
do not call for the ban of citation to foreign legal authority, but 
                                                     
structural) bans of the use of foreign law, there are a significant number of state 
legislatures that have passed legislation outlawing the judicial use of foreign and 
international law.  In addition, federal resolutions and legislations have also been 
introduced.  One might argue that these state legislative actions might not be 
unconstitutional and unenforceable, and therefore hold mostly a symbolic value.  
The same argument can be made for non-binding federal resolutions.  This 
argument that these actions are merely symbolic and therefore are not legitimate 
attempts at manufacturing outsiders ignores the incremental nature of social 
change and the power of symbolic victories.  The passage of the non-binding 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 was symbolic, but also 
aspirational.  The UDHR was the precursor to more binding international treaties 
in the 1960s, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
140 While the senate judiciary committee is comprised of eighteen members, 
there are only a small minority of these members who have (or had) actively and 
consistently debated the role of foreign law and the judiciary.  They include senate 
Republicans Brownback, Coburn, Cornyn, DeWine, Kyl and Sessions, and 
Democrats Leahy and Schumer. 
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instead believe that this is something that is to be worked out 
amongst the courts. 
There is no legal world that has decided to enter into an 
ongoing management process with respect to foreign law.  The role 
of foreign law is contested.  One might argue that conservative 
senators appear to be engaged in ongoing management because 
over the years, they have not formally banned foreign law.  This, 
however, would be an unreasonably high bar to measure whether 
a group was trying to eradicate an outsider.  Whenever 
conservative senators discussed foreign law during the hearings, 
they always discussed why it should be banned, and why it had no 
place in judicial decision-making. 
This debate over the proper role of foreign law takes place in a 
society with a particular legal structure where there is no explicit 
Constitutional or federal ban on the judiciary’s use of foreign laws 
as persuasive authority.  Therefore, given this legal structure, how 
do conservative senators go about eradicating foreign law? 
Senators can attempt to eradicate foreign law by both de jure and de 
facto means.  Senators can attempt to change the de jure law and 
pass legislation and/or resolutions that ban the use of foreign 
law.141  Because of federal constitution separation of powers 
concerns, there are likely to be challenges to these legislative bans, 
as has occurred when state legislatures have passed their own bans 
prohibiting the use of foreign and international law. 
This Article focused on senators trying to change the practice of 
foreign citation in a more de facto sense.  This study showed how 
senators operated well within the structural limits of the U.S. 
Constitution and exercised their authority “to advise and consent” 
with the President of the United States with respect to judicial 
nominations.  Under this authority, senators can refuse to approve 
nominees who cite foreign law if a majority of the senate judiciary 
committee members view the citation of foreign law as a 
prohibited “outsider” practice.  In addition, the framing of foreign 
law as an outsider may have a chilling effect on nominees and 
other judges and stifle their use and citation of foreign law.142  The 
                                                     
141 This has already happened at the state level, where a number of state 
legislatures have passed legislation to ban foreign law.  See sources cited supra 
note 17. 
142 The chilling effect is often used in the context of curbing behavior under 
the threat of litigation.  A standard definition of the chilling effect states: “In 
constitutional law, the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of a 
constitutional right, especially one protected by the First Amendment to the 
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conservatives that this project highlights are not necessarily trying 
to create Simmelian strangers who are located on the border of the 
insider/outsider.  Instead, they are trying to produce outsiders and 
ban the use of foreign law. 
 The postmodern stranger is not necessarily a conscious 
construction of ongoing management, but the visible manifestation 
of conflict.  This conflict placed foreign law at the insider/outsider 
border where it now sits as a sign of the border.  Foreign laws 
become strangers not because the legal and political arena manages 
them as strangers, but because of the combination of the 
contestation over their insider/outsider status and the existing 
structures that shape those contests and limit the roles of 
conservative legislators.  Structurally, foreign laws are not 
forbidden (i.e., there are no laws prohibiting judges from using 
foreign authority).  Yet a significant conservative segment of legal 
and political elites have attempted to move foreign law to the 
periphery.  The by-product of this movement is that foreign law 
sits at (or on) the border of insider/outsider status and now 
occupies the status of stranger.  In occupying this status, it also 
fulfills a useful and beneficial function—it signals various limits of 
boundaries of society (i.e., every senator can agree that it would 
violate sovereignty and democracy if judges used foreign and 
international law as binding authority).  While this function does 
not explain fully why the status of the stranger exists, it supports 
the continued existence of the stranger status. 
6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The primary goal of this Article was to improve our theoretical 
understanding of the social production of strangers.  The major 
finding is that strangers, at least in a postmodern sense, are 
produced as a by-product when members of society contest the 
                                                     
United States Constitution, by the potential or threatened prosecution under, or 
application of, a law or sanction.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD LAW DICTIONARY 70 
(Susan Ellis Wild ed., 2006).  I do not believe that court judges and justices, at least 
on a federal level, fear litigation; however, the huge uproar in Congress and in the 
popular media may have caused some justices to rethink how often, or whether 
they plan to cite to foreign authority.  I think that this is present in the ways in 
which the nominees discussed the use of foreign law.  However, I admit that what 
may be chilling with respect to how a Supreme Court nominee expresses his or 
her views on foreign law may not have the same chilling effect on that same 
nominee once the appointment to the court is confirmed, and he or she has life 
tenure. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/2
02_LYKE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  
2014] MAKING STRANGE LAWS 735 
meaning of social boundaries.  Social structure is a vital component 
to this understanding because it not only helps shape the meaning 
of boundaries, but it can also determine the actual position of 
whether a subject is fixed inside, outside, or on the border.  This 
Article generates this theory by analyzing the social conflicts that 
arise over the use of foreign law, where proponents justify the use 
of foreign law as a useful, innocuous source of learning, and 
opponents dismiss it as a biased, anti-American dangerous pariah. 
 Another goal of this Article was to begin a theorization of the 
stranger that was broader and moved beyond relations merely 
with people to include the cultural artifacts (e.g., laws) that people 
produce.  This work attempts to establish that these types of 
relations can include such cultural and social products.  Future 
work should explore the social production of other artifacts as 
dangerous strangers.  One popular example could be the kerfuffle 
started in the congressional cafeteria when French fries were 
banned and renamed freedom fries.143  Are there other strange 
socially and/or humanly manufactured items?  If so, what is the 
process that led to their status of strangeness? 
Future work should also explore the relationship between the 
social production of strange objects (i.e., law) and the production of 
strangers (i.e., people).  This project touched on how conservative 
senators linked the otherness of disadvantaged minority identities 
to foreign law.  It is important, however, to discuss how the 
transformation of foreign law into a danger stranger affects the 
holders of disadvantaged minority status.  Perhaps the creation of 
strange law is another iteration of boundary making. 
Conservatives who seek to regulate what some perceive as the 
threatening identities of some minorities are able to avoid critiques 
against claims of bigotry if they use foreign law as a proxy.  This 
strategy allows conservatives to battle foreign elite laws of Europe, 
as opposed to the rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual men and 
women.  The end result, however, is that by attacking foreign laws, 
conservatives are also attacking the progressive principles to which 
they are attached.  Future work can illuminate how the creation of 
strange laws (or any other strange items) is used in the ordering of 
society. 
                                                     
143 Sean Loughlin, House Cafeterias Change Names for ‘French’ Fries and ‘French’ 
Toast, CNN  (Mar. 12, 2003, 10:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/. 
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